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This thesis investigates the impact of fragmentation in the ownership of complementary
patents or patent thickets on firms’ market value. This question is motivated by the
increase in the patent ownership fragmentation following the pro-patent shifts in the US
since 1982. The first chapter uses panel data on patenting US manufacturing firms from
1979 to 1996, and estimates the impact of patent thickets on firms’ market value. I find
that patent thickets lower firms’ market value, and firms with a large patent portfolio size
experience a smaller negative effect from their thickets. Moreover, no systematic difference
exists in the impact of patent thickets on firms’ market value over time. The second chapter
extends this analysis to account for the indirect impacts of patent thickets on firms’ market
value. These indirect effects arise through the effects of patent thickets on firms’ R&D and
patenting activities. Using panel data on US manufacturing firms from 1979 to 1996, I
estimate the impact of patent thickets on market value, R&D, and patenting as well as the
impacts of R&D and patenting on market value. Employing these estimates, I determine
the direct, indirect, and total impacts of patent thickets on market value. I find that patent
thickets decrease firms’ market value, while I hold the firms R&D and patenting activities
constant. I find no evidence of a change in R&D due to patent thickets. However, there
is evidence of defensive patenting (an increase in patenting attributed to thickets), which
helps to reduce the direct negative impact of patent thickets on market value.
The data sets used in Chapters 1 and 2 have a number of missing observations on
regressors. The commonly used methods to manage missing observations are the listwise
deletion (complete case) and the indicator methods. Studies on the statistical properties of
these methods suggest a smaller bias using the listwise deletion method. Employing Monte
Carlo simulations, Chapter 3 examines the properties of these methods, and finds that
in some cases the listwise deletion estimates have larger biases than indicator estimates.
This finding suggests that interpreting estimates arrived at with either approach requires
caution.
Keywords: Innovation, Fragmentation, Market Value, Patent, Patent Thicket, R&D,
Spillovers, Missing Data, Unobserved Error Terms, Censored Regressors, Listwise Deletion,
Dummy Indicator
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Introduction
Economic growth is a key objective in economic policy. Accordingly, identifying factors
that contribute positively to growth is a central aim in economic analysis. The literature
suggests innovation as one of the major forces behind growth. For instance, Solow (1957)
finds that technological changes play an important role in economic growth, and Schum-
peter (1942) argues that innovation is a key factor, and the replacement of old ideas with
new ideas generates growth.
Patent systems play an important role in fostering innovation. Patents grant innovators
the right to prevent others from the unauthorized use of their innovation for a limited time.
Such rights promote innovation by allowing innovators to recover their costs and perhaps
experience profit. Patents also encourage innovation by disclosing knowledge via the pub-
lication of patent documents. All innovators are able to benefit from the public stock of
knowledge. However, knowledge spillovers can also lead to underinvestment in innovation
as innovators cannot reap all the benefits associated with their innovation (Nelson, 1959
and Arrow, 1962). Patents help promote innovation by capturing the positive knowledge
spillovers and alleviating the underinvestment in innovative activities.
However, despite the crucial roles that patents play in encouraging innovation and eco-
nomic growth, they may also have counter effects. Patent systems can grant a large number
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of patents, and generate a technology market with highly fragmented patent ownership.
Each subsequent (cumulative) innovator builds innovation upon a set of complementary
patents, owned by previous innovators. Shapiro (2001) refers to a set of complementary
patents faced by a subsequent innovator a “patent thicket.”Patent thickets require such
innovators to obtain permission from all the right holders in their thicket, before they can
commercialize their own innovation. In patent systems that lead to highly fragmented
technology markets, subsequent innovators are faced with dense patent thickets, which
means they have to deal with a large number of patent holders in their patent thicket.
The costs of dense patent thickets, which are discussed below, can act as a disincentive to
innovation.
The costs imposed on subsequent innovators by dense patent thickets arise from the
high licensing fees associated with the complement problem and double marginalization,
the transaction costs, and the possibility of hold-up and prolonged litigation, all explained
below. The origin of the complement problem goes back to Cournot (1838); he analyzed a
manufacturer of brass who needed two inputs: zinc and copper. He showed that the price of
brass is lower when the inputs are controlled by a single monopolist than when each input
is controlled by a separate monopolist. Shapiro (2001) illustrates the negative impacts of
fragmentation in patent ownership by applying the complement analysis of Cournot (1838)
to the case of intellectual property rights. Shapiro (2001) shows that in more fragmented
technology markets, subsequent innovators pay higher licensing fees because of the multiple
right holders in their thicket. In other words, these innovators pay higher licensing fees
when the complementary patents in their thicket are owned by multiple licensors than
when those patents are owned by only one licensor. The large licensing fees associated
with dense patent thickets can lead to underinvestment in subsequent innovation. This
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aspect is emphasized by Heller and Eisenberg (1998) for the biomedical sector. They
compare the underinvestment problem to the tragedy of commons, that is, the overuse of
resources.1 Arguing that the large number of intellectual property rights in the biomedical
sector leads to underuse of knowledge resources, they call this phenomenon “the tragedy
of anti-commons.”
Patent thickets are also costly due to increased double marginalization in fragmented
technology markets. The double marginalization problem refers to a vertical sequence of
monopolists in which a markup is charged on a markup (e.g., Varian, 2010, p. 492). In
the case of intellectual property rights, a subsequent innovator is a downstream monopolist
who needs to obtain licenses from a stream of upstream monopolists (the owners of existing
patents upon which the subsequent innovator’s own innovation builds upon or relies on).
This implies a double markup and increases the licensing fee for the subsequent innovator.
Another cost of dense patent thickets is the transaction cost for identifying and ne-
gotiating licenses for complementary patents (Shapiro, 2001). Due to the difficulty in
identification, firms often become aware of related existing patents only after making large
sunk investments into their own innovation process. The associated potential for both
hold-up and prolonged litigation discourages firms from investing in innovation.
Subsequent innovators in the current US patent system are experiencing dense patent
thickets, because of the huge number of patents and a high degree of fragmentation in
patent ownership. The story behind the current situation in the US patent system goes
back to the 1970s. In those years, there was a concern that United States’ technology had
fallen behind other industrialized countries (Meador, 1992). Thus, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) was established in 1982 (Gallini, 2002). Prior to
1Fishing grounds and clean water are examples of commons.
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this, patent disputes were solved in the appellate courts of various circuits that differed in
their interpretation of patent law (Jaffe and Lerner, 2007, p. 9). The CAFC helped unify
standards across circuits and granted stronger patent rights to patent holders in infringe-
ment lawsuits (Gallini, 2002). Therefore, the CAFC increased the benefits of obtaining
patents by strengthening patent rights. This situation created considerable incentives for
obtaining patents, and the pro-patent attitude of the CAFC led to a proliferation of patents
in the US economy (Jaffe and Lerner, 2007, p. 10). Jaffe and Lerner (2007, p. 11) argue
that the proliferation of patents was further intensified by the decision of Congress in the
early 1990s that changed the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) from
an agency funded by tax revenues to an agency funded by fees that the USPTO collects.
Thus, the USPTO also started to grant patents extensively, feeding the proliferation of
patents. According to Jaffe and Lerner (2007, p. 10) the large number of patents gener-
ated following the CAFC and the pro-patent shifts led to a considerable fragmentation of
patent ownership in the US technology market. This situation left subsequent innovators
to deal with dense patent thickets and their costs.
The current status of the US patent system has become an increasing concern in recent
years and has led to several proposals for amendments (e.g., the 2005, 2007, and 2009 Patent
Reform Acts). These proposals have created considerable debate. The reform supporters,
represented by the Coalition for Patent Fairness, argue that the resources used to cover
the costs of dense patent thickets would be better spent on job creation and innovation.2
Innovation Alliance, in contrast, argues that the reform would weaken patent rights, which
would decrease innovation and have a negative impact on US technology leadership at the
2DiMartino, David. Coalition for Patent Fairness “Members of Senate High-Tech Task Force Ask Senate
Judiciary Leadership Not to Weaken the Patent Reform Act of 2009”
(http://www.patentfairness.org/media/press/; last accessed 30 Sept. 2009 )
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global level.3 Both sides of this debate are represented in economic literature on patent
thickets. As discussed previously, Heller and Eisenberg (1998) and Shapiro (2001) argue
that dense patent thickets deter innovation. In contrast, Merges (2001) argues that firms
largely avoid potential problems induced by patent thickets via establishing institutions
such as patent pools in which to conduct their transactions with other right holders.4
These arguments are pointing to the fact that the US patent system is acting like a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, the system is promoting innovation by protecting
the rights of innovators, and on the other hand, it is hindering innovation by building
dense patent thickets. This situation indicates a need for analysis to determine whether
any reform is needed in the current US patent system, and to examine how negatively the
dense patent thickets, formed following the CAFC, impact the economy. Therefore, the
presence and the extent of damaging impacts caused by dense patent thickets constitute
an empirical question.
The purpose of Chapters 1 and 2 of my thesis is to quantify the economic consequences
of dense patent thickets. To do so, I consider the impact of such thickets on the market
outcome of firms, which is measured by market value. Ideally, I would find the impact of
patent thickets on firms’ economic profits. However, the available information deals with
business profits. Therefore, employing market value as a measure of firms’ market outcome
is a better proxy than business profit. The rationale behind the effect of patent thickets on
firms’ market value is that the potential costs of patent thickets might change the expected
earnings of firms, and thereby change their market value.
3Metz,Cade. The Register “Techies oppose US Patent reform bill”
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/10/25/techies send letter to senate against patent reform bill/;
last accessed 25 Oct. 2007)
4According to Shapiro (2001), in a patent pool, one entity, who can be one of the patent holders, licenses
patents of two or more entities to third parties.
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In Chapter 1, I measure the impact of patent thickets on the market value of firms in
the manufacturing sector, assuming that the R&D and patenting behavior of firms do not
change with dense patent thickets. The sample of analysis is longitudinal data on 1,975
patenting publicly traded US manufacturing firms from 1976 to 1996. To my knowledge,
only Noel and Schankerman (2006), who focus on the software industry, have previously
examined the impacts of patent thickets on market value of firms. I instead examine these
impacts in the manufacturing sector. Moreover, I analyze the heterogeneous impact of
patent thickets on the market value of firms in terms of firms’ different patent portfolio
sizes, the different industries they belong to, and over time. As far as I am aware, no prior
study has analyzed these heterogeneities in the impact of patent thickets on firms’ market
value.
The results of Chapter 1 suggest that denser patent thickets decrease firms’ market
value, but patent thickets penalize market value of firms with a large patent portfolio size
less than other firms. This advantage is probably because a large patent portfolio size
increases such firms’ bargaining power in licensing negotiations, and lowers the risk of
hold-up. The other findings of Chapter 1 are that no systematic difference exists in the
impact of patent thickets on firms’ market value over time, and this finding even holds for
firms with a large patent portfolio size. The findings of this chapter can help policy makers
in devising appropriate patent policies. The smaller negative impact of fragmentation on
market value of firms with a large patent portfolio size signals to policy makers that the
current US patent system is encouraging aggressive patenting to counter the negative costs
of patent ownership fragmentation. This problem might divert the resources of firms from
R&D activities to legal activities aimed at obtaining patents on marginal innovation and
increasing the patent portfolio size of firms. In order to prevent the formation of incentives
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for obtaining patents on marginal innovations, policy makers can change the requirements
for obtaining patents to decrease costs of patent thickets.
Chapter 2 extends the analysis of the first chapter by arguing that dense patent thickets
in highly fragmented technology markets could have two types of impacts: direct and
indirect. The direct impact is the effect of patent thickets on market value of firms,
while I hold all firms’ patenting and R&D behavior constant. This impact occurs because
the potential costs of patent thickets might lower the expected earnings of firms, and
consequently, lower their market value. Estimating the direct impact of patent thickets is
not sufficient to determine the effects of patent thickets, because patent thickets might also
change the behavior of firms in terms of their patenting and R&D activities, and the changes
in these activities could contribute to future earnings of firms and their market value.
Patent thickets may encourage defensive patenting (the increase in patenting attributed to
avoiding costs of thickets) in order to increase bargaining power in negotiations with other
right holders (Ziedonis, 2004). Patent thickets may also make firms reduce their reliance on
other firms’ innovations by increasing their own R&D expenditures. Hence, I estimate the
indirect impacts of patent thickets on market value through the likely effects that thickets
have on patenting and R&D activities of firms.
Moreover, in the second chapter of the thesis I evaluate the direct and indirect impacts
of other firms’ patent thickets (patent thicket spillovers) on the market value of a given
firm. The rationale behind the direct impact of patent thicket spillovers is that other firms
charge higher licensing fees from the given firm for using their innovation. They do so
because other firms are also faced with their own patent thicket and they want to cover
the costs of obtaining licenses for the complementary patents in their own patent thicket.
Therefore, higher licensing fees that other firms charge the given firm, due to the costs of
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their own patent thicket, lower expected profits and the market value of the given firm. I
also measure the potential indirect impacts of others’ patent thickets on the market value
of the given firm through the effects of others’ thickets on patenting and R&D activities
of the given firm. Other firms’ patent thickets could make those firms raise their R&D
and defensive patenting. It is often asserted that the R&D and patenting activities of
firms have positive spillover effects on one another. The changes in R&D and patenting
activities of the given firm due to positive spillovers from other firms will be reflected in
higher expected profits and the market value of the given firm.
To find the direct and indirect impacts of patent thickets and patent thicket spillovers
in Chapter 2, I estimate the impacts of patent thickets on three outcome variables: market
value, patent, and R&D as well as the impacts of R&D and patenting on market value, using
longitudinal data on 1,272 publicly traded US manufacturing firms from 1979 to 1996. To
my knowledge, only Noel and Schankerman (2006), who focused on the software industry,
have previously examined the impact of firms’ own patent thicket on these three outcome
variables. Then, after estimating the impact of patent thickets on the outcome variables
as well as the impacts of R&D and patenting on market value, I use these estimates to
determine the direct, indirect, and total impacts of patent thickets on firms’ market value.
To my knowledge, no prior study has quantified the indirect and total impacts of patent
thickets on firms’ market value as well as the impact that other firms’ patent thickets may
have on a firm’s market value or behavior.
My results suggest that firms’ own patent thicket and patent thicket spillovers have
direct negative impacts on the market value of firms. I also find that patent thickets and
their spillovers increase defensive patenting, but do not have a statistically significant ef-
fect on firms’ R&D activities. While defensive patenting alleviates the negative impact
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that patent thickets and their spillovers have on market value, the total impact of patent
thickets and their spillovers on firms’ market value is still negative. The findings of Chap-
ter 2 indicate to policy makers that the ongoing concerns and debates over the negative
economic impacts of patent thickets are valid. They also indicate that any consideration
of patent reforms, such as increasing the requirements for obtaining patents, must weigh
any potential benefits of lowering the costs of dense patent thickets against the negative
effects that making patenting harder might have on the incentives to innovate.
While I was working on Chapters 1 and 2, I noticed a large number of missing observa-
tions on some of the regressors. In the sample of each chapter, about 30% of observations
of R&D was missing. To handle this problem, the two common approaches employed by
the empirical research are either dropping the missing observations and using the resulting
complete sample (the listwise deletion method or LW), or adding an indicator variable for
missing observations of a regressor and replacing the missing observations with a constant
(the indicator method or DI). The dropping of the missing observations leads to loss of
information and lower variation in the data. Moreover, if the missing observations are not
missing at random, the LW method could lead to selection bias and inconsistent estimates,
since the employed complete sample becomes a non-representative sample from the original
population. Nevertheless, the DI method uses all the available information, including the
missing observations on regressors (Cohen and Cohen, 1975 and Chow, 1979), and avoids
selection bias in the estimates. The comparisons between the two methods indicate a need
for an analysis of the performance of these methods.
Only a few studies analyze the performance of the DI and LW methods in models with
censored regressors and regressors with missing observations. The findings of these studies
suggest a smaller bias from using the LW method (Rigobon and Stoker, 2007 and Jones,
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1996). Nevertheless, as has been observed by Jones (1996), the DI method is widely used
in empirical research in fields such as epidemiology, sample survey research, behavioral
science, and business and economics.
The common employment of the DI method in empirical studies implies that it is likely
that the bias in estimates of the DI method is smaller than the bias of the LW method.
To examine this question, Chapter 3 studies the case of when the missing observations
of a regressor are assumed to be correlated with unobserved error terms and the value of
the regressor. The reason for focusing on this type of missingness is that it reflects many
economic conditions, and further, the existing literature does not analyze the performance
of the DI and LW methods when missingness is dependent on unobserved error terms and
the value of a regressor. Therefore, this study seeks to fill this gap using Monte Carlo
simulations, and benefits all the different fields within the applied economics literature.
The results of Chapter 3 show conditions in which the bias of the LW method is
much bigger than the DI method, when the probability of missingness on a regressor is
dependent on unobserved error terms and values of the regressor. The results imply that
the recommendation of the existing literature for using the LW method is not supported
when missingness is dependent on unobserved error terms and the value of a regressor.
Therefore, the third chapter of my thesis indicates that the selection of one approach over
the other one and interpreting the estimates under each method require greater care than




Patent Thicket and Market Value:
An Empirical Analysis
1.1 Introduction
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) was established in 1982
to strengthen patent rights and unify standards across circuits.1 The establishment of the
CAFC and the subsequent pro-patent shifts in the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) increased the benefits and ease of obtaining patents.2 These changes
1In the 1970s, there was a concern that the United States had fallen behind other industrialized countries
in terms of its technology (Meador, 1992). Thus, according to Gallini (2002), the CAFC was established to
efficiently deal with patent disputes. Prior to 1982, patent disputes were solved in the appellate courts of
various circuits that differed in their interpretation of patent law (Jaffe and Lerner, 2007, p. 9). The CAFC
helped unify standards across circuits and granted stronger patent rights to patent holders in infringement
lawsuits (Gallini, 2002). Therefore, the CAFC increased the benefits of obtaining patents by strengthening
patent rights.
2According to Jaffe and Lerner (2007, p. 11), the USPTO adopted a pro-patent attitude following the
decision of Congress in the early 1990s that changed the USPTO from an agency funded by tax revenues to
an agency funded by fees that the USPTO collects. Thus, the USPTO started to grant patents extensively.
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Figure 1.1: Total Number of Patents by Grant Year.
caused a proliferation of patents and a higher fragmentation of patent ownership in the
technology market (Jaffe and Lerner, 2007, p. 10). Figure 1.1 displays the upward trend of
patenting in the US from 1979 to 1996.3 The total number of patent applications granted
by the USPTO grew at an average annual rate of 2.2% from 1976 to 1985 and increased
to 5.8% from 1986 to 1996.
Highly fragmented technology markets result in dense patent thickets for subsequent
innovators. A subsequent (cumulative) innovator builds innovation upon a set of comple-
mentary patents, owned by previous innovators. Shapiro (2001) refers to a set of comple-
mentary patents faced by a subsequent innovator a “patent thicket.”Patent thickets require
such innovators to obtain permission from all the right holders in their thicket, before they
can commercialize their own innovation. In patent systems that lead to highly fragmented
3The original data is from 1975 to 2002. However, I limit the sample to 1979-1996 to avoid problems
associated with truncation in the data (For a more detailed explanation see Section 1.3 and Appendix
A.1).
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technology markets, subsequent innovators are faced with dense patent thickest, which
means they have to deal with a large number of patent holders in their patent thicket. The
large number of external patent holders in dense patent thickets leads to high costs, which
are discussed below.
The costs imposed on subsequent innovators by dense patent thickets arise from the
high licensing fees associated with the complement problem and double marginalization,
the transaction costs, and the possibility of hold-up and prolonged litigation, all explained
below. The origin of the complement problem goes back to Cournot (1838); he analyzed
a manufacturer of brass who needed two inputs: zinc and copper. He showed that the
price of brass is lower, when the inputs are controlled by a single monopolist than when
each input is controlled by a separate monopolist. Shapiro (2001) illustrates the negative
impacts of fragmentation in patent ownership by applying the complement analysis of
Cournot (1838) to the case of intellectual property rights. Shapiro (2001) shows subsequent
innovators in fragmented technology markets have to pay a considerable licensing fee due
to the presence of multiple right holders in their thicket. In other words, these innovators
pay higher licensing fees when the complementary patents in their thicket are owned by
multiple licensors than when the complementary patents are owned by only one licensor.
Consequently, the existence of separate licensors for complementary patents leads to higher
prices of final goods. Fragmentation in patent ownership therefore lowers both the licensors’
profits and consumers’ welfare.
Another potential consequence of patent thickets is underinvestment in subsequent in-
novation because subsequent innovators pay higher licensing fees when the ownership of
complementary patents in their patent thicket is fragmented. This aspect is emphasized
by Heller and Eisenberg (1998), who discuss the potential impacts of patent thickets on
13
innovative activities in the biomedical sector, and compare the problem to the tragedy
of commons, that is, the overuse of resources.4 They argue that the large number of
intellectual property rights in the biomedical sector leads to underuse of knowledge re-
sources, because subsequent innovators should obtain permission from patent holders in
their thicket if they want to use the complementary patents. Heller and Eisenberg (1998)
call this phenomenon “the tragedy of anti-commons.”
Patent thickets are also costly due to increased double marginalization in fragmented
technology markets. The double marginalization problem refers to a vertical sequence
of monopolists in which a markup is charged on a markup (e.g., Varian, 2010, p.492). In
the case of intellectual property rights, a subsequent innovator is a downstream monopolist
who needs to obtain licenses from a stream of upstream monopolists (the owners of existing
patents upon which the subsequent innovator’s own innovation builds upon or relies on).
This implies a double markup and increases the licensing fee for the subsequent innovator.
Patent thickets also imply larger transaction costs for identifying and negotiating li-
censes for complementary patents (Shapiro, 2001). The difficulty in identification makes
the use of ex-ante solutions costly or even impossible.5 Firms often become aware of related
existing patents only after making large sunk investments in their own innovation process.
The associated potential for hold-up and litigation further discourages firms from investing
in manufacturing facilities and innovation.
This chapter evaluates the economic impact of fragmentation in the ownership of com-
plementary patents by estimating the effect of patent thickets on the market value of
4Fishing grounds and clean water are examples of commons.
5An example of an ex-ante solution is the formation of a patent pool. According to Shapiro (2001), in
a patent pool, one entity, who can be one of the patent holders, licenses patents of two or more entities to
third parties.
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firms. Costs of patent thickets, including large licensing fees, large transaction costs, and
the increased likelihood of being held-up can be expected to decrease future profits, and
consequently, lower the market value of firms. This further implies that firms become less
profitable, and this aspect might lower innovation.
Using panel data on 1,975 publicly traded US manufacturing firms from 1979 to 1996,
this chapter exploits firm level data over a relatively long time period. The analysis builds
on the methodologies developed in Griliches (1981) and Hall et al. (2005).6 To my knowl-
edge, the only other study that examines the impact of patent thickets on market value
is Noel and Schankerman (2006), who employ data from the US software industry. While
Noel and Schankerman use data over longer time period (1980-1999), they rely on a smaller
set of firms (121) specific to a single industry (the software industry). My analysis, in con-
trast, uses firm level data across a variety of manufacturing industries.7
To assess the impact of patent thickets on the market value of firms, I estimate a
nonlinear Tobin’s q equation. My results suggest that more fragmentation in the technology
market decreases the market value of firms. I also find that firms with a large patent
portfolio size are penalized less than other firms, probably because a larger patent portfolio
size increases their bargaining power in licensing negotiations and lowers the risk of the
hold-up problem. The likelihood of the hold-up problem for these firms might also be
lower since other firms in the thicket have an incentive to avoid possible future retaliations.
6My analysis expands the studies of Griliches (1981) and Hall et al. (2005), since it includes a measure
of fragmentation of patent ownership as a possible determinant of firms’ market value. In addition, the
samples of these studies have a shorter time span than my sample of analysis.
Griliches (1981) examines the impact of patenting and R&D on the market value of firms using a sample
of 157 large US firms from Compustat data for the period from 1968 to 1974. Hall et al. (2005) analyze
the driving factors of the market value of firms by examining the impact of patenting and patent citations
on the market value of firms. This study employs a non-linear model in a sample of 1982 patenting
manufacturing US firms from 1979 to 1988.
7Further, the measure of patent thicket in my analysis is different from that of Noel and Schankerman
(2006). For more explanation, see section 1.2.
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Further, I examine whether the effect of fragmentation changes over time and whether the
effect of fragmentation varies across industries. I relate these analyses to changes in patent
policies and differences in the nature of innovations across industries. The results show
that patent thickets do not have systematic time effects on firms’ market value, and this
finding holds even for firms with a large patent portfolio size. The other result is that the
impacts of patent thickets on firms’ market value are independent of industry.8
The prior empirical evidence on the effects of patent thickets, which is summarized in
Table 1.1, is mixed. Murray and Stern (2007) find only a modest anti-commons effect in
biomedical patenting. Walsh et al. (2005) perform a survey on 414 biomedical researchers
in universities, government, and non-profit institutions. They find that limited access to
intellectual property does not restrict biomedical research. Walsh et al. (2003) perform
70 interviews with personnel in universities, the biotechnology sector, and pharmaceutical
firms. According to their interviews, the anti-commons problem is manageable. Hall and
Ziedonis (2001) and Ziedonis (2004) examine the semiconductor industry, and find that
firms patent aggressively in more fragmented technology markets and that this effect is
more pronounced for capital-intensive firms.
The main contributions of my analysis are two-fold. First, I measure the impact of
patent thickets on the market value of firms in the manufacturing sector. As stated be-
forehand, Noel and Schankerman (2006), who focus on software industry, have previously
examined the impact of patent thickets on firms’ market value. I instead examine these
8Additionally, I find that market structure does not play a role in how the stock market values firms,
when I control for patent thicket effect. This result holds, when I also control for the effect of possible
heterogeneity at the firm level as a result of the patent portfolio size of firms, time, or both time and
patent portfolio size. The statistically insignificant impact of the market structure variable on the market
value remains robust, when I control for heterogeneity across industries at the firm level. According
to Lindenberg and Ross (1981), a possible explanation is that markets with high concentration do not
necessarily reflect market power, and consequently, the market structure has no impact on the market
value.
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Table 1.1: A Summary of Previous Findings in the Literature
Author Data Main finding
Murray and Stern 340 peer-reviewed They find only a
(2007) scientific articles modest anti-commons
from 1997 to 1999 effect exists in
(Observations= 1,688). biomedical patenting.
Noel and Schankerman Unbalanced panel of 121 Patent thickets have
(2006) US software firms statistically significant
from 1980 to 1999 negative impacts on Tobin’s
(Observations= 865). q in the software industry.
Hall et al. Unbalanced panel of Intangible assets of firms
(2005) 4,864 US publicly traded [measured by
manufacturing firms R&D-, patent-, and
from 1979 to 1988 citation intensities]
(Observations= 12,118). have statistically significant
positive impact on Tobin’s q.
Walsh et al. A survey on 414 They find that limited access
(2005) biomedical researchers in to intellectual property
universities, government, does not restrict
and non-profit institutions. biomedical research.
Ziedonis (2004) 67 US semiconductor firms Patent thickets have
from 1980 to 1994 statistically significant
(Observation= 667). positive effects on
the patent propensity of
semiconductor firms.
Walsh et al. 70 interviews with The anti-commons
(2003) personnel in universities, problem is manageable.
biotechnology sector,
and pharmaceutical firms.
Hall and Ziedonis 95 US semiconductor They find evidence of
(2001) firms from 1979 to 1995 positive impacts of
based on data collected patent thickets on
from interviews with patenting propensity
industry representatives of firms.
(Observation= 946).
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impacts in the manufacturing sector. Second, I analyze the heterogeneous impact of patent
thickets on the market value of firms in terms of firms’ different patent portfolio sizes, the
different industries they belong to, and over time. To my knowledge, no prior study has
evaluated these heterogeneities in the effect of patent thickets on market value.
1.2 Empirical Framework
The empirical model that I employ to assess the impacts of patent thickets on market
value of firms is based on Griliches (1981) and Hall et al. (2005). The general empirical
framework used in these studies is







The variable logMarket V alueit is the log of the market value of firm i in year t. Following
Hall et al. (2005), the market value of a firm is calculated as the sum of the current market
value of common and preferred stocks, long-term debt adjusted for inflation, and short-term
debts of the firm net of assets. In the analysis of Hall et al. (2005), the variable logSVit
includes time fixed effects (mt) and the error term (εit). The term εit denotes the other
factors that influence market value of firms. I assume that εit is additive, independently and
identically distributed across firms and over time, and serially uncorrelated. The variables
TAit and INAit are tangible and intangible assets, respectively. Their measurement is
discussed shortly. The coefficient γ is the shadow price of the intangible asset to tangible
asset ratio. Moving the variable TAit to the left-hand side in equation (1.1) allows left-
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+mt + εit. (1.2)
Following Hall et al. (2005), the variable TAit is measured by the book value of firms
based on their balance sheet. The book value of a firm is calculated as the sum of net
plant and equipment, inventories, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries, and intangi-
bles and others. All components of TAit are adjusted for inflation.
10 INAit is measured
based on the approach of Hall et al. (2005), who measure the variable INAit with R&D in-
tensity (R&Dstockit/TAit), patent intensity (PATstockit/R&Dstockit), and citation yield
per patent or citation intensity (CITEstockit/PATstockit). The variables R&Dstockit,
PATstockit, and CITEstockit measure the stock of R&D, patents, and citations, respec-
tively. These variables are constructed based on a declining balance formula with the
depreciation rate of 15%.11 Hall et al. (2005) justify their method for measuring INAit
of a firm by arguing that the firm’s R&D expenditures show the intention of the firm to
innovate. The R&D expenditures might become successful and result in an innovation.
Patents of the firm catalogue the success of the innovative activity, and the importance of
each patent is measured by the number of times it is cited in subsequent patents. There-
fore, I employ R&D, patent, and citation intensities to measure INAit following Hall et
9The parameter σ is a scale factor in the value function. According to Hall et al. (2005) the assumption
of constant returns to scale with respect to assets usually holds in the cross-section. Thus, σ becomes one.
10Inflation adjustments are based on the CPI urban US index for 1992 (Source: http://www.bls.gov).
11Following Hall et al. (2005), the employed declining balance formula is Kt = (1−δ)Kt−1 +flowt. The
variables Kt and flowt stand for knowledge stock and knowledge flow at time t, respectively. I define the
initial stock of knowledge variables as the initial sample values of the knowledge variables similar to Noel
and Schankerman (2006). I select the parameter δ or depreciation rate equal to 15%. Most researchers
settled with this deprecation rate (Hall et al., 2000, 2005, and 2007). Hall and Mairesse (1995) show
experiments with different deprecation rates, and they conclude that changing the rate from 15% does not
make a difference. As a result, I select δ = 15%, and this selection assists in easy comparisons to previous
studies.
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+mt + εit. (1.3)
There is usually a difference between the application and grant date of patents. Out of
the patents applied close to the end date of the sample, only a small fraction is granted,
and the rest are granted outside the reach of the sample. This issue indicates truncation in
patent counts. Citation counts are also truncated. Truncations in citations happen since
only citations that occur within the sample are observable. I correct for these truncations.
As a result, the PATstockit and CITEstockit variables are built based upon patent and
citation counts, which are corrected for the truncation problems. See Appendix A.1 for a
more detailed analysis of correction procedures.
To estimate the impact of patent thicket on the market value of firms, I augment
equation (1.3) with the fragmentation index variable used by Ziedonis (2004). The mea-
surement of the fragmentation variable (logFit) is discussed shortly. To control for the
effects of market structure on market value, I also add the log of a Herfindahl index for






















+δ1 logFit + δ2 logHHIit +mt + εit. (1.4)
The variable HHIit is calculated using firm-level sales based on 4-digit SIC codes. Equation
(1.4) is estimated using a nonlinear least squares estimator.12
12There are several issues worth noting with respect to equation (1.4). I do not approximate
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Some firms might have a permanently higher market value than others due to omitted






















+δ1 logFit + δ2 logHHIit + αi +mt + εit. (1.5)
Parameters αi capture firm unobserved heterogeneities. Following Bloom et al. (2005) and
Noel and Schankerman (2006), I replace the non-linear terms in equation (1.5) with series
expansions. Thus, equation (1.5) becomes



























+ δ1 logFit + δ2 logHHIit
+mt + αi + εit, (1.6)
where the parameters Ψ, Ω, and Γ denote the polynomials of the measures of intangible
assets. To avoid the omitted variable bias due to unobserved firm heterogeneities, I estimate
equation (1.6) using a within estimator for panel data. Estimates of equation (1.6) imply
that the fifth order polynomial is satisfactory. I do not consider the multiplicative terms of










because such an approximation is correct only if the ratio of intan-
gible assets to tangible assets is very small. However, this ratio is large for high technology firms in the
manufacturing sector. The other issue is that I use contemporaneous R&D because, according to Hausman
et al. (1984), the within firm correlation of R&D over time is not large and many firms have short R&D
histories.
13For example, this could be the result of the stock of past innovations at the beginning of the sample,
or a better ability of absorbing external technologies for reasons that are not explained by independent
variables.
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Hall et al. (2005) argue against including firm fixed effects in equation (1.6). They
indicate that an important factor that creates heterogeneity across firms is the difference in
their R&D expenditures, which implies R&D intensity is highly related to firms’ individual
characteristics. Therefore, controlling for firm fixed effects removes this source of difference
among firms and implies over-correction. Hall et al. (2005) further explain that the
explanatory variables are predetermined and changing very slowly over time, which require
the use of a first-differences estimator in order to obtain consistent estimates.14 However,
according to Griliches and Hausman (1984), a small measurement error could lead to a large
downward bias in first-differences estimates. Despite the argument in Hall et al. (2005)
against controlling for the firm unobserved heterogeneities, I estimate equation (1.6) as a
robustness check.
Equations (1.4) and (1.6) are employed as base models for estimation in Chapter 1.
To capture the heterogeneity of the impact of the patent thickets on the market value of
firms in terms of firms’ different patent portfolio sizes, the different industries they belong
to and over time, I will add relevant variables to equations (1.4) and (1.6).
A question I have not explored yet is measuring the extent of fragmentation in patent
ownership. I employ the fragmentation index used by Ziedonis (2004). This measure is
based on a normalized Herfindahl index, which is usually used for measuring the level of









14A predetermined or weakly exogenous variable is a variable that its current and lagged values are not
correlated with the current period error terms, but its future values might be correlated with the current
period error terms (Cameron and Trivedi, 2006, p. 748).
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The variable citeijt is the number of citations made by firm i in its patent documents to
the patents of firm j at time t.15 The variable citeit is the count of all the citations made
by firm i in year t. The index Fit is zero when all the citations are made to the patents of
one firm and one when every citation is to a patent of a different firm. Figure 1.2 displays
the change in the fragmentation index of a hypothetical firm as a function of the number
of external right holders that this firm cites, assuming that the total number of citations
made in the patents of this firm remains constant at 20.16,17
15Each citation made in a patent document is a reference to a complementary patent. In calculating the
fragmentation index for a firm, I do not consider citations made to the firm’s own patents or to expired
patents.
16Assuming the number of complementary patents or external right holders in the patent thicket of
the hypothetical firm is N, I plot Figure 1.2 making the following assumptions about the citations that
external right holders’ patents receive from the hypothetical firm: If N=1, the only right holder receives
all the citations and Fit = 0. If N=2, each of the right holders receives 10 citations to its patents and
Fit = 0.5. If N=4, each of them receives 5 citations and Fit = 0.75. If N=6, 5 of them receive 3 citations
and one of them receives 5 citations (Fit = 0.8). If N=8, 6 of them receive 3 citations and one of them
receives 2 citations (Fit = 0.86). If N=10, each of them receives 2 citations and Fit = 0.9. If N=12, 8 of
them receive 2 citations and four of them receive one citation (Fit = 0.91). If N=14, 6 of them receive 2
citations and the rest receive one citation (Fit = 0.92). If N=16, 4 of them receive 2 citations and the rest
get only one citation (Fit = 0.93). If N=18, 2 of them receive 2 citations and the rest receive one citation
(Fit = 0.94). If N=20, all of them receive one citation and Fit ≈ 1
17I also conducted the analyses in Chapter 1 using the measure of patent thickets in Noel and Schanker-
man (2006). Using this measure in equations (1.4) and (1.6) did not change the empirical results. Noel and
Schankerman (2006) employ a measure which considers only the citations of each firm to patents of the
four largest rivals in the technology market. However, the measure of fragmentation that I use is based on
the citations to the patents of all firms. Therefore, my employed measure is able to capture heterogeneity
among the small and large firms in terms of their hold-up probabilities. The smaller firms might hold
up larger firms with higher probability than large firms. This is because smaller firms may assume that
the likelihood of dealing with the same large firm is quite low in the future. However, larger firms might
assume a correspondingly higher likelihood and therefore an enhanced probability of retaliation.
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Figure 1.2: Fragmentation Index and External Right Holders.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Data Sources
I build the sample in my analysis based on three different data sets. The first data is
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) data, consisting of information on
patents granted from 1963 to 2002 and their citations.18 The second data is the Compustat
North American Annual Industrial data from Standard and Poors, consisting of 500,000
observations on 26,000 US publicly traded firms from 1979 to 2002.19 This data set includes
18The NBER patent and citation data files were originally built for the data from 1963 to 1999, and
they are available in http://www.nber.org/patents. Hall et al. (2001) provide a detailed explanation of
these files. Bronwyn H. Hall later updated these files from 1999 to 2002. I use the updated files, which
are available at: http://elsa.berkeley.edu/∼bhhall/.
The Patent file contains information on utility patents granted between 1963 to 2002. The patent file
has information on citations in patents granted between 1975 to 2002.
19The publicly traded firms are those traded on the New York, American, and regional stock exchanges,
as well as over-the-counter in NASDAQ.
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information on firms’ R&D expenditures, sales, and components of firms’ book and market
values.20 The third data is a company identifier file, which facilitates linking the patent
and citation files from the NBER to Compustat data by firm names.21 This link file
is required because assignees apply for patents either under their own name or under
their subsidiaries’ names. The patent and citation information from the USPTO, which
are used for building the NBER data, do not specify a unique code for each patenting
identity. However, Compustat has a unique code for each publicly traded firm. The link
file contains the assignee number of each firm mentioned on patents in the NBER data,
and its equivalent identifier in the Compustat data.
I select a sample of manufacturing firms (SIC 2000-3999) from the publicly traded US
firms in Compustat data from 1979 to 2002. This selection results in an unbalanced panel
of 19,868 firms with 365,589 observations.22 Manufacturing firms are selected because
this sector includes high technology firms, and the patent-related issues and fragmented
technology markets are usually more important for them. Additionally, the sample of
publicly traded firms is not an exact representative of all firms in the high technology
sectors. However, due to the data limitation, it is the best possible approximation of
these firms. I also select a sample from the NBER data. After accounting for withdrawn
patents, cited patents granted before 1963, and considering only the patents of publicly
traded firms, my sample from the NBER data yields almost 19 million observations from
20Following Hall et al. (2005), I measure the book value of firms (TAit) based on their balance sheet.
The book value of a firm is calculated as the sum of net plant and equipment, inventories, investments in
unconsolidated subsidiaries, and intangibles and others. All variables are adjusted for inflation. Following
Hall et al. (2005), I measure the market value of a firm (Market V alueit)as the sum of the market value
of common and preferred stocks, long-term debt adjusted for inflation, and short-term debts of the firm
net of assets.
21The company identifier file is available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/∼bhhall.
22SIC is the Standard Industrial Classification by the United States Government.
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1979 to 2002.23
I link the selected sample from the NBER data, explained above, to corresponding
observations of publicly traded US manufacturing firms in the sample from Compustat by
using Hall’s identifier file. Dropping missing observations on Market V alueit and TAit
of firms results in a sample that consists of 68,203 observations relating to 6,402 unique
patenting and non-patenting firms from 1979 to 2002 (almost 2000 firms in each year).24
This sample includes 20,852 missing observations on R&D.
The patent and citation data are truncated. The truncation in the patent data is the
result of the difference between the application and grant dates of patents. The truncation
in citation counts is the result of the fact that patents receive citations for a long period
after they are granted. Therefore, some citations to patents are received out of the range
of the analyzed sample. Moreover, there is a further truncation in citation counts in the
beginning of the sample as citation data is available only for the patents granted since 1975
from the NBER data.
The data has been corrected for these truncations. The correction procedures are
explained in the Appendix A.1. After these changes, I further limit the sample to 1979-
1996 to avoid any potential problems arising from truncations. As a result, I focus only
23I do not consider patents without any citations to previous patents or patents with only self-citations
in my sample from the NBER data because these patents do not face problems related to fragmentation
in the technology market. As a result, I do not have a patenting firm without any citation to previous
patents in my sample.
According to the USPTO’s website, withdrawn patents are the patents that are not issued
(http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/search/withdrawn.jsp).
24I have replaced the missing observations of the variables that I use in the construction of
Market V alueit and TAit (The variables used in building Market V alueit and TAit are defined in section
1.2) with zero and then I have built the variables Market V alueit and TAit. In the next step, I have
dropped observations for which the value of variables Market V alueit and TAit are zero. If I calculated
the variables Market V alueit and TAit before replacing the missing observations of their components with
zero, and dropped the missing observations on Market V alueit and TAit, this would only leave me with
52,736 observations and would lead to a loss of information.
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on when the data is the least problematic, leaving me with an unbalanced panel of 1,975
patenting manufacturing firms with 10,273 observations from 1979 to 1996.25 The result
is a longitudinal firm-level data set on firm-level financial variables and patenting activity.
Table 1.2 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables. The average firm in the
sample is R&D intensive.26 On average, a firm experiences a fairly large fragmentation
index of 0.61 and a patent portfolio size of 19 patents.27 Using corrected patent counts,
Figure 1.3 illustrates the distribution of patent counts by each firm in the sample. Con-
sistent with previous studies, the distribution of patents is highly skewed (e.g., Hall et al.,
2005). Figure 1.4 demonstrates that variable Fit was increasing on average from 1979 to
1996.
1.3.2 Exogenous Sources of Identifying Variation
While not all of the variation in the fragmentation is necessarily exogenous to the unob-
served characteristics of firms, some is driven by two sources that are arguably exogenous
to unobserved firm characteristics: the pro-patent shifts in the US patent system (see
25This sample includes firms that have at least one patent. Considering these firms facilitates measuring
the variables: PATstockit and CITEstockit.
26The average firm is R&D intensive. The average of R&D intensity in the sample is 0.90.
27In the sample the variable Fit is missing if the firm has only self-citations or do not cite anything in
its patent. The reason is that in constructing Fit, I do not consider patents that only self-cite or they do
not have any citation in their patent as the owners of such patents do not come across with the risk of
being held-up. As a result, the variable Fit for the firms who owns such patents is missing in the sample.
This situation is equivalent to no impact from fragmentation, and I replace these observations with zero.
Some of the observations of the variable Fit are zero. These observations are for the firms that all of the
citations in their patents are made to the patents of one entity or they have only one patent with one
citation in year t. The variable logFit in equations (1.4) and (1.6) is missing in both of the cases that
Fit is missing or is zero. Therefore, to control for this issue, I adopt the indicator method for handling
missing data on explanatory variables (for the detailed explanation of this method refer to Chapter 3 of
the thesis). I define an indicator variable which takes the value one, if the variable logFit is missing and
takes the value zero otherwise. Then, I replace the missing observations of the variable logFit with an
arbitrary value, here zero.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Description Obs Mean Median Min Max Std.er
Market Market Value 10273 1052.30 103 0.022 70772 3439
V alueit
TAit Book Value 10273 1410.27 113 0 57532 4122
qit (Market 10271 1.33 0.67 0.05 660 10.55
V alue/TA)it
Fit Fragment- 10273 0.61 0.75 0 0.98 0.35
ation Index
R&Dstockit Stock of 9178 346 34 0 28865 1270
R&D
PATstockit Stock of 10273 85.54 10.87 1 5426 290.1
Patents
CITEstockit Stock of 10273 826 89 1.19 79115 3460
Citations
(R&Dstock/ R&D 9176 0.90 0.29 0 184.8 4.30
TA)it Intensity
(PATstock/ Patent 9178 0.98 0.44 0 100.24 2.40
R&Dstock)it Intensity
(CITEstock/ Citation 10273 10.66 6.45 1.17 346.11 14.71
PATstock)it Intensity
Patent Number of 10273 19 3 1 1256 66.82
Portfolio Sizeit Patents
HHIit Market 10273 0.47 0.40 0 1 0.27
Structure
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of Patents in the Sample.
Figure 1.4: Patent Thicket over Time.
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Figure 1.5: Kernel Density of Fit for Small Firms.
introduction) and the pure randomness of having successful innovations.
To analyze the impact of pro-patent shifts following the establishment of the CAFC,
I illustrate the Kernel density distributions of the variable Fit for the periods before and
after the reforms, 1979-1985 and 1986-1996, respectively. In these analyses, I group firms
based on their patent portfolio size into three categories: firms with fewer than 3 patents
(small firms), firms with 4 to 42 patents (medium firms), and firms with more than 42
patents (large firms). Figures 1.5 to 1.7 investigate the effect of the pro-patent shifts on Fit
for each group. In Figures 1.5 to 1.7 except for Figure 1.7, the kernel densities experience
a shift to the right following the pro-patent policy changes, which imply higher Fit after
the establishment of the CAFC.28
28Figures 1.5 to 1.7 display that the impact of pro-patent policies depends on the number of patents
owned by the firm. Therefore, there is both over-time and cross-firm variation in Fit that help in identifying
the empirical estimates. The different finding of Figure 1.7 is quite puzzling as it points to the fact that
the impact of the pro-patent changes following the establishment of the CAFC is not that important for
firms with a large patent portfolio size. This finding might imply that large firms change their type of
innovation from cumulative to non-cumulative following reforms. Therefore, they do not have to cite other
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Figure 1.6: Kernel Density of Fit for Medium Firms.
Figure 1.7: Kernel Density of Fit for Large Firms.
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1.4 Results
Table 1.3 contains estimates of the effect of patent thickets (logFit) on the market value of
firms. Column 1 contains the nonlinear least squares estimates of equation (1.4), column 2
reports estimates for equation (1.6) with firm fixed effects, and column 3 shows estimates
for the same model as equation (1.6) but with industry fixed effects as a robustness check.29
I include industry fixed effects to control for the possibility of dense patent thickets which
may be more likely in some industries relative to others.30 Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level.31
The nonlinear least squares estimator in column 1 of Table 1.3 shows that the patent
thicket (logFit) has a negative and statistically significant impact on the market value of
the firm at the 10% level of significance. The coefficient of logFit implies that market
value declines by 0.8% as fragmentation increases by 10%.32 The other key finding of
this column is that all of the knowledge stock variables have a positive and statistically
significant impact on the market value, and this finding is consistent with previous studies
in the literature.33
I also estimate the impact of patent thickets on the market value of firms with controls
for firms fixed effects as a robustness check in column 2 of Table 1.3 (using equation,
firms’ patents, which keeps their fragmentation index unchanged.
29Industry fixed effects are defined based on four-digit SIC codes.
30One example is the semiconductor industry (SIC3674), which is characterized with highly cumulative
innovations (Ziedonis, 2004 and Hall and Ziedonis, 2001).
31Clustering at the industry level (based on four-digit SIC codes) generates similar results to clustering
at the firm level.
31The sample includes 1,975 patenting firms with 10,273 observations from 1979 to 1996. The signs ***,
**, and * mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The numbers in the parentheses are the
cluster-robust standard error (clustered at the firm level).
32The standardized estimated impact is that a one deviation increase in logFit lowers logMarket V alueit
by 0.113 standard deviation units (1.10%).
33One example of studies with similar results is Hall et al. (2005).
32
Table 1.3: Patent Thicket and Market Value
Dependent Variable: NLS Fixed Effect Pooled with Industry
logqit
31 Estimation Fixed Effects












































































Dependent Variable: NLS Fixed Effect Pooled with Industry
logqit Estimation Fixed Effects
logHHIit 0.037* 0.035 -0.037
(0.022) (0.026) (0.023)
D(logFit = 0) 0.054* 0.017 0.046**
(0.028) (0.017) (0.020)
D(R&Dit = 0) 0.106*** -0.267*** -0.167***
(0.033) (0.084) (0.039)
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.3536 0.1546 0.2772
1.6). With the inclusion of firms fixed effects, the variable logFit keeps its negative impact
on the market value but not its statistically significant effect. The coefficient suggests
that an increase in fragmentation by 10% is associated with a market value decrease by
0.4%.34 In column 3, the patent thicket has a negative and statistically significant impact
on the market value controlling for industry fixed effects (using equation (1.6) with industry
fixed effects rather than firm fixed effects). A 10% rise in fragmentation is significantly
correlated with a 0.6% decrease in the market value. In summary, the results from different
specifications indicate a negative impact from patent thickets on the market value of firms.35
Using the estimates of column 1 of Table 1.3, I calculate the semi-elasticities of knowl-
34Empirical results suggest that the fifth order polynomial is satisfactory. The reason is that the coeffi-
cients of the polynomials higher than the fifth order are not statistically significant.
35Another finding from Table 1.3 is that the market structure (logHHIit) does not have a statistically
significant impact on how the stock market values the firm. This finding is in contrast to the common
notion that in highly concentrated markets, firms have higher market power that lead to larger expected
earnings for firms and consequently, higher market value. This result further implies that the market
structure measure does not reflect market power. To the best of my knowledge there are few studies in
the economic literature that focus specifically on the impact of market structure on market value of firms.
My results are similar to previous findings (Lindenberg and Ross, 1981 and Hirschey, 1985). According
to Lindenberg and Ross (1981), a possible reason for the statistical insignificance of the logHHIit is that
markets with high concentration do not necessarily reflect market power.
34


































edge stock variables as well as the elasticity of the variable logFit at both the mean and
median of the covariates in Table 1.4. These elasticities allow me to evaluate the size of
the impacts of the explanatory variables on the firms’ market value.36 According to Table
1.4, an increase of 1% in the R&D intensity of the firm increases Market V alueit by 2.3%,
an extra patent per million $ of R&D raises Market V alueit by 3%, and an additional
citation per patent boosts Market V alueit by 0.3%. Market value also declines by 0.8%
as fragmentation increases by 10%.
36I consider both the mean and median because of the skewness in the distribution of the knowledge
stock variables.
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Table 1.5 analyzes the possible heterogeneity in the impact of patent thicket on the
market value of firms as a result of the patent portfolio size of firms. To analyze the impact
of this heterogeneity, I add the variable logFit × logPatent Portfolio Sizeit to equation
(1.4) and use the resulting equation for the estimates in column 1 of Table 1.5. The results
show that the estimated coefficient of the variable logFit × logPatent Portfolio Sizeit
is positive and statistically significant, while logFit preserves its negative and significant
impact on the market value of firms in column 1. This finding implies that firms with a
large patent portfolio size in a fragmented technology market have higher market values
than other firms, probably because a larger patent portfolio size increases such firms’
bargaining power in licensing negotiations and lowers the risk of being held-up. Moreover,
the likelihood of the hold-up problem for these firms might be lower, since other firms have
incentives to avoid possible future retaliations. The results of column 1 of Table 1.5 are
robust to the models with firm fixed effects and industry fixed effects in columns 2 and 3
(based on equation (1.6)).
To capture the heterogeneous impact of patent thickets on market value over time,
I analyze the effect of patent thickets on the market value of firms before and after the
establishment of the CAFC in 1982. I divide the sample into two sub-samples, which consist
of observations for the period before the establishment of the CAFC and the period after
the establishment of the CAFC. However, using equation (1.4) for each sub-sample, the
results are sensitive to the selection of the year in which reforms become effective. In order
to avoid this problem and examine whether the impact of patent thickets on the market
37The sample includes 1,975 patenting firms with 10,273 observations from 1979 to 1996. The numbers
in parentheses are clustered robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level).
38The sample includes 1,975 patenting firms with 10,273 observations from 1979 to 1996. The signs ***,
**, and * mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The numbers in the parentheses are the
cluster-robust standard error (clustered at the firm level).
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Table 1.5: Patent Thicket, Patent Portfolio Size, and Market Value
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3)
logqit
38 NLS Fixed Effect Pooled with Industry
Estimation Fixed Effects












)it 0.004*** -0.487 0.363
(0.002) (0.387) (0.309)
logFit× logPatent 0.161*** 0.084*** 0.148***
Portfolio Sizeit (0.040) (0.025) (0.030)
logHHIit 0.035 0.033 -0.039*
(0.022) (0.026) (0.023)
D(logFit = 0) 0.024 0.014 0.025
(0.028) (0.017) (0.020)
D(R&Dit = 0) 0.101*** -0.275*** -0.173***
(0.033) (0.084) (0.039)
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes
Time Fixed Effectss Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.3558 0.1563 0.2793
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Table 1.6: Time Effect of Patent Thickets on Market Value
Dependent Variable: logqit
39
D1979 × logFit -0.024 D1988 × logFit 0.001
(0.087) (0.143)
D1980 × logFit -0.117 D1989 × logFit -0.055
(0.074) (0.136)
D1981 × logFit 0.004 D1990 × logFit -0.059
0.083 (0.120)
D1982 × logFit -0.089 D1991 × logFit -0.334**
(0.079) (0.146)
D1983 × logFit -0.040 D1992 × logFit -0.336**
(0.078) (0.150)
D1984 × logFit -0.180 D1993 × logFit -0.048
(0.111) (0.110)
D1985 × logFit -0.241** D1994 × logFit 0.131
(0.105) (0.112)
D1986 × logFit -0.016 D1995 × logFit 0.003
(0.113) (0.138)
D1987 × logFit -0.167* D1996 × logFit -0.066
(0.100) (0.141)
value of firms has been increasing over time as a result of the pro-patent shifts, I augment
equation (1.4) with variables Dyear× logFit, where the variable Dyear (year =1979,...,1996)
is a dummy variable for each year.
Table 1.6 contains the results of this exercise and reports only the coefficients of the
new variables added to equation (1.4). Most of the coefficients of these variables are
not statistically significant. Figure 1.8 plots the scatter plot of the estimated coefficients
of variables Dyear × logFit, where year =1979,...,1996, with their upper and lower 95%
confidence intervals. The results do not offer evidence in favour of a systematic time effect
in the impact of fragmentation index on the market value of firms.
39The estimating specification of Table 1.6 is based on equation (1.4) and is estimated with a non-linear
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Figure 1.8: Estimated Coefficients of Variables Dyear× logFit.
Table 1.7 takes into account two heterogeneities (time and patent portfolio size) in
the impact of patent thickets. This table evaluates how the impact of patent thick-
ets on the market value changes over time for firms with a large patent portfolio size.
The estimating equation is based on equation (1.4) with extra variables Dyear × logFit ×
logPatent Portfolio Sizeit, and Dyear× logFit, where year =1979,...,1996 and Dyear is
a dummy variable for each year. Table 1.7 displays the results of this exercise and re-
ports only the coefficients of the new variables added to equation (1.4). The estimated
coefficients of these variables in Table 1.7 are statistically insignificant with respect to
most years. Figure 1.9 plots the scatter plot of the estimated coefficients of variables
Dyear × logFit × logPatent Portfolio Sizeit with their upper and lower 95% confidence
intervals. The findings of Tables 1.6 and 1.7 imply that I cannot find a systematic time
least squares estimator. The sample includes 1,975 patenting firms with 10,273 observations from 1979 to
1996. The signs ***, **, and * mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The numbers in the
parentheses are the cluster-robust standard error (clustered at the firm level).
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Figure 1.9: Estimated Coefficients of Variables Dyear×logFit × logPatent Portfolio Sizeit.
effect from patent thickets on the market value of firms, and this result even applies to
firms with a large patent portfolio size.
Table 1.8 provides the estimates of patent thickets on the market value of firms by
industry.37 Column 1 illustrates the impact of fragmentation on the market value for the
average industry, while the remaining columns report the impact of patent thickets on firms
in each industry. Although the estimates are negative, they are statistically insignificant.
Fragmentation has a higher than average penalty on the market value of firms in the
36The estimating specification of Table 1.7 is based on equation (1.4) and is estimated with a non-linear
least squares estimator. The sample includes 1,975 patenting firms with 10,273 observations from 1979 to
1996. The signs ***, **, and * mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The numbers in the
parentheses are the cluster-robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level).
37The industry classifications are based on Hall and Vopel (1997). In Table 1.8, the chemical industry
includes chemical products, the computer industry includes the computers and computing equipment,
the drugs sector consists of optical and medical instruments, and Pharmaceutical. The electrical sector
includes Electrical machinery and electrical instrument & communication equipment. The mechanical
sector includes Primary metal products, fabricated metal products, machinery & engines, transportation
equipment, motor vehicles, and auto parts. The percentage of each industry in my sample is: chemical
3.5%, computers 7%, drugs 22%, electrical 28%, and mechanical 19%.
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Table 1.7: Time Effect of Patent Thickets, Patent Portfolio Size, and Market Value
Dependent Variable: logqit
36
D1979 × logFit -0.112 D1979 × logFit 0.182**
(0.083) × logPatent Portfolio Sizeit (0.072)
D1980 × logFit -0.211** D1980 × logFit 0.184***
(0.084) × logPatent Portfolio Sizeit (0.067)
D1981 × logFit -0.104 D1981 × logFit 0.216**
(0.091) × logPatent Portfolio Sizeit (0.090)
D1982 × logFit -0.105 D1982 × logFit 0.089
(0.092) × logPatent Portfolio Sizeit (0.084)
D1983 × logFit -0.020 D1983 × logFit 0.012
(0.086) × logPatent Portfolio Sizeit (0.069)
D1984 × logFit -0.184 D1984 × logFit 0.068
(0.122) × log Patent Portfolio Sizeit (0.105)
D1985 × logFit -0.209* D1985 × logFit -0.017
(0.119) × logPatent Portfolio Sizeit (0.091)
D1986 × logFit -0.068 D1986 × logFit 0.182*
(0.123) × logPatent Portfolio Sizeit (0.102)
D1987 × logFit -0.211* D1987 × logFit 0.159*
(0.109) × logPatent Portfolio Sizeit (0.087)
D1988 × logFit -0.022 D1988 × logFit 0.087
(0.187) × logPatent Portfolio Sizeit (0.132)
D1989 × logFit -0.156 D1989 × logFit 0.241*
(0.165) × logPatent Portfolio Sizeit (0.137)
D1990 × logFit -0.084 D1990 × logFit 0.159
(0.127) × logPatent Portfolio Sizeit (0.120)
D1991 × logFit -0.377** D1991 × logFit 0.220*




D1992 × logFit -0.343** D1992 × logFit 0.101
(0.147) × logPatent Portfolio Sizeit (0.190)
D1993 × logFit -0.084 D1993 × logFit 0.158
(0.107) × logPatent Portfolio Sizeit (0.109)
D1994 × logFit 0.051 D1994 × logFit 0.225*
(0.113) × logPatent Portfolio Sizeit (0.128)
D1995 × logFit -0.056 D1995 × logFit 0.372***
(0.138) × logPatent Portfolio Sizeit (0.140)
D1996 × logFit -0.105 D1996 × logFit 0.185
(0.146) × logPatent Portfolio Sizeit (0.135)
chemical and computers sectors. The insignificant impact on the drugs sector is likely due
to the fact that in the pharmaceutical sector, firms use patents to block the development
of alternative drugs by rivals and therefore, patents are not used for expropriating rivals
(Cohen et al., 2000).
I conduct a joint hypothesis test of the equality of the impact of the variable logFit
on the market value of firms across industries.38 Even though the point estimates for the
coefficient of logFit are different across industries, the estimates are not statistically signif-
icantly different from each other across industries (F-statistics=1.24)– possibly because of
the lack of the power of the test. As a robustness check, I also weight the variables with the
patent portfolio size of firms and estimate equation (1.4) with a weighted nonlinear least
squares estimator. This specification also cannot reject the joint hypothesis of the equality
37The sample includes 1,975 patenting firms with 10,273 observations from 1979 to 1996. The signs ***,
**, and * mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The numbers in the parentheses are the
cluster-robust standard error (clustered at the firm level).
38To perform this test, I define a separate dummy variable for each industry (Dindustry). Then, I
include the dummy variables for each industry and the multiplication of these dummy variables with the
key variables of equation (1.4) in equation (1.4). Then I test for the equality of the coefficients of the
variables Dindustry × logFit across industries.
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Table 1.8: The Impact of Patent Thicket across Industries




logFit -0.076* -0.370 -0.080 -0.050 -0.068 -0.066
(0.042) (0.226) (0.163) (0.118) (0.081) (0.076)
(R&Dstock
TA
)it 0.309*** 1.139 0.061 0.357*** 0.350*** 0.634***
(0.052) (0.893) (0.049) (0.083) (0.129) (0.223)
( PATstock
R&Dstock
)it 0.036*** -0.016 0.096* 0.112** 0.046** 0.020
(0.010) (0.011) (0.056) (0.045) (0.021) (0.020)
(CITEstock
PATstock
)it 0.044** 0.027 -0.000 0.000 0.008** 0.003
(0.002) (0.042) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
logHHIit 0.037* 0.003 -0.180* 0.042 -0.034 0.027
(0.022) (0.089) (0.098) (0.053) (0.045) (0.048)
D(R&Dit = 0) 0.054* 0.428** 0.058 1.039*** 0.257*** 0.058
(0.028) (0.173) (0.118) (0.186) (0.092) (0.073)
D(logFit = 0) 0.106*** 0.034 0.063 0.013 0.086* 0.066
(0.033) (0.176) (0.102) (0.086) (0.047) (0.045)
Observation 10273 545 694 1850 2800 2348
Number of 1975 69 138 437 548 384
firms
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
Adjusted-R2 0.3536 0.6791 0.2102 0.2415 0.3517 0.4384
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of the coefficient of the variable logFit across industries.
39 There are also differences across
sectors in the knowledge stock variables, and these results are also consistent with the
findings of Hall et al. (2005).
1.5 Conclusion
This study provides empirical evidence on the negative impact of patent ownership frag-
mentation on firms’ market value. The analysis contributes to the literature on the deter-
minants of the market value of firms and research on the patent thicket problem.
My results show that firms experience a statistically and economically significant de-
crease in their market value when the technology market is fragmented. My results expand
on the work of Noel and Schankerman (2006) and show that the negative impact of patent
thickets on the market value of firms is not restricted to a single industry.
In this chapter, I analyze the heterogeneous impact of patent thickets on the market
value of firms in terms of firms’ different patent portfolio sizes, the different industries
they belong to, and over time. To my knowledge, no prior study has evaluated these
heterogeneities in the effect of patent thickets on market value. The findings indicate
that firms with a large patent portfolio size experience a smaller negative impact from
patent thickets on their market value. This finding is possibly because firms with a large
patent portfolio size have fewer problems in cross-licensing negotiations. Their larger patent
portfolio size increases their bargaining power in the licensing negotiations and lowers the
risk of being held-up. The other result of this chapter is that patent thickets do not have
systematic time effects on the market value of firms, and this finding even holds for firms
39A similar result holds when I estimate equation (1.4) with a Weighted Pooled Least Squares estimator.
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with a large patent portfolio size. Another outcome of this chapter is that market structure
does not have a statistically significant impact on how the stock market values firms after
controlling for fragmentation in the technology market. This finding holds, when I analyze
the effect of possible heterogeneity at the firm level as a result of the patent portfolio size
of firms, time, or both time and patent portfolio size. This result also holds, when I control
for heterogeneity across industries at the firm level. The insignificant impact of market
structure on market value is similar to the few studies available in the literature, such as
Lindenberg and Ross’s (1981) and Hirschey’s (1985). Finally, my results suggest that the
impact of patent thickets on the market value of firms is independent of industry.
The findings of Chapter 1 can help policy makers in devising appropriate patent policies
because this chapter quantifies the costs of patent thickets. The smaller negative impact of
fragmentation on market value of firms with a large patent portfolio size signals to policy
makers that the current US patent system is encouraging aggressive patenting to counter
the negative costs of fragmentation. This problem might divert the resources of firms from
R&D activities to legal activities aimed at obtaining patents on marginal innovation and
increasing the patent portfolio size of firms. To avoid forming incentives for firms to obtain
patents on marginal innovations, policy makers can change the patenting requirements to





Patenting, and Induced R&D: An
Empirical Analysis of the Costs and
Unintended Potential Benefits of
Fragmentation in Patent Ownership
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I assess the economic impacts of patent thickets by estimating their effect
on the market value of firms. I argue that dense patent thickets in highly fragmented
technology markets could have two types of impacts: direct and indirect. The direct impact
is the effect of patent thickets on firms’ market value, while I hold the all firms’ patenting
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and R&D behavior constant. The potential costs of patent thickets, as discussed above,
lower the expected earnings of firms and thereby lower their market value. Estimating the
direct impact of patent thickets is not sufficient to determine the effects of patent thickets,
because patent thickets might also change the behavior of firms. Hence, I estimate the
indirect impacts of patent thickets as well.
Specifically, I estimate the indirect potential impacts that patent thickets have on mar-
ket value through the likely effects that patent thickets have on patenting and R&D ac-
tivities of firms. Patent thickets may encourage firms to patent defensively (the increase
in patenting attributed to avoiding thicket costs) in order to increase bargaining power in
negotiations with other right holders (Ziedonis, 2004). Firms may also reduce their reliance
on other firms’ innovation by increasing their R&D expenditures. The R&D activities and
defensive patenting behavior of firms may increase their market value, and therefore reduce
or even eliminate the negative direct impact that patent thickets have on the market value
of firms.
In addition, this study captures the potential direct and indirect impacts that firms’
patent thickets might have on one another (patent thicket spillovers). Assuming a given
firm, the rationale behind the direct impact of other firms’ patent thickets on the market
value of the given firm is that other firms charge higher licensing fees from the given firm
for using their complementary patents. They do so because other firms are also faced with
their own patent thicket, and they want to cover the potential costs of obtaining licenses
for the complementary patents in their own patent thicket. Therefore, higher licensing fees
that other firms charge the given firm due to the costs of their own patent thicket lower
expected profits and stock market valuation of the given firm. I also measure the potential
indirect impacts of others’ patent thickets on the market value of the given firm through
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the effects of others’ patent thickets on the given firm’s patenting and R&D activities.
Other firms’ patent thickets could make them raise their R&D and defensive patenting.
It is often asserted that the R&D and patenting activities of firms have positive spillover
effects on one another. The changes in R&D and patenting activities of the given firm due
to positive spillovers from other firms will be reflected in higher expected profits and the
market value of the given firm.
In my analysis, I use panel data on 1,272 publicly traded US manufacturing firms from
1979 to 1996. The analysis builds on the methodologies developed in Griliches (1981) and
Hall et al. (2005).1 My analysis also allows for the presence of R&D spillovers and patent
thicket spillovers (other firms’ patent thickets) among firms, and to measure spillovers I
employ the methodologies developed in Bernstein and Nadiri (1989), Jaffe (1986), and
Bloom et al. (2006), all of whom examine R&D spillovers.
My results suggest that patent thickets, both firms’ own as well as other firms’, have a
negative direct impact on the market value of firms. I also find that both firms’ own and
other firms’ patent thickets increase defensive patenting, but do not have a statistically
significant effect on firms’ R&D activities. While defensive patenting alleviates the direct
negative impact that patent thickets have on market value, the total impact of patent
thickets on the market value of firms is still negative. This finding implies that the concerns
over the negative impacts of patent thickets are valid. The prior empirical evidence on the
effects of patent thickets is mixed. For a detailed summary of the previous findings in the
literature refer to section 1.1 of Chapter 1.
1Griliches (1981) examines the impact of patenting and R&D on the market value of firms using a
sample of 157 large US firms from Compustat data for the period from 1968 to 1974. Hall et al. (2005)
analyze the driving factors of the market value of firms by examining the impact of patenting and patent
citations on the market value of firms. This study employs a non-linear model in a sample of 1982 patenting
manufacturing US firms from 1979 to 1988.
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This chapter makes three contributions to the literature. First, to calculate the direct
and indirect impacts of patent thickets on the market value of firms, I estimate the effects
that patent thickets have on patenting and R&D as well as on market value, using three
separate estimating equations. To my knowledge, only Noel and Schankerman (2006), who
focus on the software industry, have previously examined the impacts of patent thickets
on these three outcome variables. I instead examine the impacts of patent thickets on
these three outcome variables in the manufacturing sector. Second, I use the estimates
of the three empirical equations to determine the direct, indirect, and total impacts of
patent thickets on firms’ market value. To my knowledge, no prior study has quantified
the indirect and total impacts of patent thickets on the market value of firms. Third, my
estimating equations allows for the possibility that other firms’ patent thickets also have
direct and indirect impacts on the market value of a given firm. As far as I am aware,
no prior study has considered the impact that other firms’ patent thickets may have on a
firm’s market value or behavior.
2.2 Empirical Framework
In this section, I first present the functional relationships that determine the total impact
of patent thickets on the market value of firms. In the second subsection, I present three
estimating equations, one for each functional relationship. In the third subsection, I discuss
how the parameter estimates can be used to calculate the direct, indirect, and total impacts
of patent thickets on the market value of firms. In the fourth subsection, I discuss measuring
the patent thicket variables used in the analysis.
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2.2.1 Three Functional Relationships
The empirical framework is based on three functional relationships that enable me to
calculate patent thickets’ direct and indirect impacts on market value. The first functional
relationship is the impact of a firm’s own patent thicket (F ) and other firms’ patent thickets
(spillF ) on the firm’s market value:
Market V alue = f(F, spillF,R&D,Patents, ...). (2.1)
As is depicted in this relationship, R&D and patenting activities of a firm also impact its
market value. Since patent thickets may influence R&D expenditures and the patenting
behavior of firms, measuring the total impact of patent thickets on market value requires
that I estimate the impact of patent thickets on R&D and patenting as well. As a result,
the second functional relationship is the impact of a firm’s own and other firms’ patent
thickets on the firm’s R&D expenditures:
R&D = g(F, spillF, ...), (2.2)
and the third functional relationship is the impact of a firm’s own and other firms’ patent
thickets on the firms’ patenting behavior:
Patent = h(F, spillF,R&D, ...). (2.3)
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As is illustrated in relationship (2.3), patenting activity by a firm is also influenced by its
R&D expenditures.2
The estimating equations for the relationships (2.1) through (2.3) are presented below.
After estimating the impacts of the right-hand side variables in the three relationships, I






































The total impact of patent thickets on market value is calculated as the sum of direct
impact (2.4) and the two indirect impacts (2.5-2.6).
2The R&D expenditures of a firm impact its patenting, as successful R&D leads to innovation, and the
firm can obtain patents for innovation (Griliches and Pakes, 1980).
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2.2.2 Three Estimating Equations
Market Value Equation
To estimate the relationship (2.1) depicting the direct impacts of patent thickets on the
market value of a firm, I use




























+ δ4 logsaleit−1 + δ5 logsaleit−2
+δ6 logHHIit−1 + α
MV




For a detailed derivation of equation (2.7) see Appendix B.1. The dependent variable
logqit is the logarithm of Tobin’s q.
3 The variables logFit−1 and logspillFit−1 measure the
firm’s own patent thicket and the other firms’ patent thickets, respectively. The construc-
tion of these variables is explained in section 2.2.4. The variables (R&Dstock/TA)it−1,
(PATstock/R&Dstock)it−1, and (CITEstock/PATstock)it−1 are R&D intensity, patent
intensity, and citation yield per patent (citation intensity), respectively. These variables
measure the intangible assets of the firm. The construction of these variables is discussed
in Appendix B.1. The parameters Ψ, Ω, and Γ denote the polynomials of the measures
of intangible assets. The variable logspillR&Dit−1 captures potential (positive) spillovers
from other firms’ R&D expenditures on the firm’s market value.4 The construction of
3This variable is explained in Appendix B.1.
4The R&D activities of other firms raise the available research effort in the economy, which could help
the firm to achieve more innovation and consequently, higher future net cash flows and market value.
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this variable is discussed in Appendix B.3. The variable logHHIit−1 controls for market
structure impacts.5 The parameters αMVi and mt represent firm and time fixed effects,
respectively.6 The variable εMVit is the error term.
The lag structure in the right-hand side variables of equation (2.7) is designed to alle-
viate the reflection problem (Manski, 1993), which could make the estimates of the market
value equation inconsistent.7 This problem points to the fact that it is difficult to distin-
guish whether the coefficients on the spillover variables (logspillR&Dit−1, logspillFit−1)
reflect actual spillover effects or (technological opportunity) shocks that are correlated
across related firms. The distributed lag structure in the firm-level sales (logsaleit−1 and
logsaleit−2) decrease the potential inconsistency from demand shocks.
8 To avoid the omit-
ted variable bias due to unobserved firm heterogeneities, I estimate equation (2.7), using
a within estimator for panel data.9
5To control for market structure, I use a Herfindahl index (HHI) that utilizes firm-level sales in four-
digit SIC codes.
6I assume that αMVi is additive, time-invariant and not correlated across firms.
7I assume that the lagged values of the right-hand side variables are not correlated with εMVit . An
alternative solution would be to use more distant lags as instruments.
8Higher order lags of the firm-level sales were not statistically significant.
9Estimates of equation (2.7) imply that the fifth order polynomial is satisfactory. I do not consider the




To estimate the relationship (2.2), I apply the equation
logR&Dit = θ1 logR&Dit−1 + θ2 logFit−1 + θ3 logspillFit−1
+θ4 logspillR&Dit−1 + θ5 logsaleit−1






The parameters αR&Di and mt represent firm and time fixed effects, respectively. The
variable εR&Dit is an idiosyncratic error term.
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The lag structure on the right hand side is designed to lessen the impact of the re-
flection problem. The reflection problem could make the estimates of the R&D equation
inconsistent. Any shock that has an impact on the R&D expenditures of the firm is likely
to have impacts on other firms’ R&D expenditures in the same technology field. Thus,
a correlation between the R&D of other firms and their patent thickets with the given
firm’s R&D expenditures could be related to actual spillover effects or to technological
opportunity shocks that all the firms are experiencing.
The distributed lag structure in the firm-level sales decreases the inconsistency from
possible demand shocks.11 In order to capture the dynamics of the firm’s R&D expen-
ditures, I include one lag of the dependent variable as an explanatory variable in this
equation.12 Based on the argument in Nickell (1981), the long time dimension in the
10The fixed effects αR&Di are assumed to be additive, time-invariant and not correlated across firms.
11Higher order lags of the firm-level sales were not statistically significant.
12According to Pakes (1985), previous values of R&D expenditures have impact on the current firms’
R&D expenditures. I only consider one lag of the dependent variable in the right-hand side of equation
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panel data used in Chapter 2 prevents inconsistent estimates due to the lagged dependent
variable in equation (2.8).13 To avoid the omitted variable bias due to unobserved firm
heterogeneities, I estimate equation (2.8) using a within estimator for panel data.
Patenting Equation
As the patent data is inherently count data, I adapt the approach in Hausman et al. (1984)
by estimating the relationship (2.3) using
E(Patentit|XRHSit ) = exp(β1 logFit−1 + β2 logspillFit−1 + β3 logspillR&Dit−1
+β4 logR&Dstockit−1 + β5 logsaleit−1 + β6 logsaleit−2 (2.9)
+β7 logHHIit−1 + β8 logpre-sample patentsi
+mt).
The dependent variable is the number of successful patent applications made by a firm in
a given year. A Poisson estimator is the appropriate estimator for equation (2.9).14
(2.8) because, according to Griliches (1979), the R&D expenditures are highly correlated over the years,
and estimating the separate contribution from each lag with precision is hard.
13An alternative approach would be to use the panel generalized method of moments estimator of
Arellano and Bond (1991) for dynamic panels. This approach uses the panel GMM estimator, where the
instruments are lags of the dependent variable, and they are assumed to be weakly exogenous.
14The Poisson estimator requires the satisfaction of the equi-dispersion assumption (equality of the
conditional mean and variance of the dependent variable). Cameron and Trivedi (2006, p. 670), assuming
yit as a dependent variable with a count data nature and Xit as a set of regressors, argue that if the
hypothesis H0: α = 0 in the specification of over-dispersion: var(yit|Xit)=exp(X ′itβ)+αexp(Xitβ)2 cannot
be rejected, equi-dispersion assumption holds. Therefore, to test for equi-dispersion, they suggest building
an auxiliary regression







where µ̂it is exp(X ′itβ̂), which is the fitted value of the Poisson model, assuming that the first moment in
the Poisson model is E(yit|Xit) = exp(X ′itβ). Therefore, following Cameron and Trivedi (2006, p. 670), I
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One lag of the right hand side variables is included to mitigate the reflection prob-
lem.15 The distributed lags of firm-level sales are included to capture demand shocks. The
parameter mt represents time fixed effects.
Firms’ unobserved heterogeneities could make estimates of patent thicket impacts on
patenting inconsistent. Firms might differ because of their pre-sample stock of innovations,
or their abilities to absorb external technologies for reasons that are not explained by
independent variables. Blundell et al. (1999) use a mean-scaling approach to control for
firm fixed effects. They argue that one interpretation of such effects is the entry level
of innovation of each firm, and this innovation is uncorrelated with subsequent shocks to
innovation. Therefore, they use the pre-sample information on the patenting propensity
of firms to construct a pre-sample average. Since the right-hand side variables in equation
(2.9) are pre-determined, I follow the mean-scaling approach of Blundell et al. (1999)
to control for firm fixed effects and include the variable logtextitpre− samplepatentsi in
equation (2.9). This variable is the average of the pre-sample patent counts of firm i.
estimate equation (2.9) with Poisson estimator and calculate the fitted value. Then using the fitted value,
I build the auxiliary regression, and estimate it with a linear Least Squares estimator. The results show
that α is statistically significant and over-dispersion exists in the data of this paper.
The over-dispersion problem leads to inefficiency of estimates in the Poisson model, but the Poisson-
based estimates remain consistent. According to Gourieroux et al. (1984), consistency of estimates holds
as long as the conditional mean is correctly specified because the Poisson model belongs to the linear
exponential class of models. Following Hall and Ziedonis (2001), I use the Poisson model, and to overcome
the inefficiency, I employ the robust standard errors. To solve the over-dispersion problem, some of
the studies such as Ziedonis (2004), suggest using the negative binomial estimator. The estimates in
the negative binomial approach are consistent if the true distribution of the data is a negative binomial
distribution. Nevertheless, the underlying distribution of the data is not evident.
15Any shock that has impact on the R&D investments of the firm and therefore, its patenting propensity
is likely to have an impact on other firm’s R&D and consequently their patenting in the same technology
field. Thus, a correlation between R&D spillovers and patent thicket spillovers with the given firm’s patent
propensity could be related to actual spillover effects or could be the result of technological opportunity
shocks that all firms experience.
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2.2.3 Using the Estimates to Calculate the Direct, Indirect, and
Total Impacts
Assuming the steady state condition, which is Xit = Xit−1 = Xi, holds for any variable
Xit, the equations (2.7) through (2.9) can be rewritten as






















































E(Patenti|XRHSi ) = exp(β1 logFi + β2 logspillFi + β3 logspillR&Di
+β4 logR&Dstocki + (β5 + β6) logsalei (2.12)
+β7 logHHIi + β8 logpre-sample patentsi).
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Using equations (2.10-2.12) the direct impact (2.4) can be calculated as
DIRECT = δ1 + δ2, (2.13)


























× (β2 + β3), (2.15)
respectively, where Patent is the average of patent counts in the entire sample. See Ap-
pendix B.2 for the detailed steps of deriving equations (2.14) and (2.15).
2.2.4 Measuring Patent Thickets
To measure the extent of fragmentation in patent ownership, I employ the fragmentation
index used by Ziedonis (2004). This measure is explained in Chapter 1 in section 1.2.
Similar to the measurement of R&D spillovers (Appendix B.3), I measure the extent of




ρij × Fjt, (2.16)
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which is a weighted sum of other firms’ patent thickets. The weight parameter, ρij, mea-
sures the distance between firm i and j (Appendix B.3). Following Noel and Schankerman
(2006), the construction of ρij is based on the distribution of citations across technology
classes in the patent data.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Data sources
The sample of analysis in Chapter 2 is same as the sample in Chapter 1 except that I
include both patenting and non-patenting firms in the sample to facilitate estimation of
equation (2.9). Following Bloom et al. (2005), I further exclude firms with less than
four consecutive years of data. This aspect facilitates the calculation of the knowledge
stock variables in the sample of patenting and non-patenting firms.16 As a result, the
sample of analysis in Chapter 2 is an unbalanced panel of 1,272 manufacturing firms with
14,214 observations from 1979 to 1996. Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics of all
variables. The average firm in the sample is large and R&D intensive.17 On average, a
firm experiences a large fragmentation index of 0.70 and has 14 patents. The mean and
median of variables spillFit and spillR&Dit are not that different.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate that variables Fit and spillFit were increasing on average
from 1979 to 1996. The distribution of patent counts by each firm in Chapter 2 is similar
to Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1.
16I also correct for the truncation in the patent and citation counts as I explained in section 1.3 of
Chapter 1. The correction procedures are in Appendix B.4.
17The average firm is large, because it has 13,000 employees. This firm is R&D intensive, since its R&D
intensity is 0.83.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Description Obs Mean Median Std.er Min Max
Market Market Value 14214 867 78 3073 0 70772
V alueit
TAit Book Value 14214 1222 108 3721 0 61659
qit (Market 14207 1.14 0.67 4.76 0 390
V alue/TA)it
Fit Fragment- 9110 0.70 0.81 0.291 0 0.98
ation Index
spillFit Others’ 14135 18.73 16.36 11.47 0.21 0.78
Thicket
spillR&Dit R&D 14126 19516 14910 16107 79.63 117631
Spillovers
R&Dflowit The Level 12533 80.03 8.24 296 0 6099.34
of R&D
R&Dstockit The Stock 14214 307.2 21.46 1250 0 28958
of R&D
Patentit Patent 14214 14 1 58 0 1256
Counts
PATstockit Stock of 14214 64.22 5.64 260 0 5415.17
Patents
CITEstockit Stock of 9110 1152 126 4232 1.19 79115.o8
Citations
(R&Dstock/ R&D 14207 0.83 0.26 5.29 0 383.98
TA)it Intensity
(PATstock/ Patent 12523 0.54 0.23 1.55 0 104.50
R&Dstock)it Intensity
(CITEstock/ Citation 9110 13.5 8.47 19.49 1.17 416.98
PATstock)it Intensity
Saleit Firm-Level 13986 1766 186 5888 0 146991
Sales
HHIit Market 14214 0.43 0.36 0.26 0 1
Structure




Figure 2.1: Own Patent Thicket over Time.
Figure 2.2: Other Firms’ Patent Thickets over Time.
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2.3.2 Exogenous Sources of Identifying Variation
While not all of the variation in the fragmentation is necessarily exogenous to the unob-
served characteristics of firms, some is driven by two sources that are arguably exogenous
to unobserved firm characteristics: the pro-patent shifts in the US patent system (see
introduction) and the pure randomness of having successful innovations.
To analyze the impact of pro-patent shifts following the establishment of the CAFC, I
use the Kernel density distributions of the variables Fit and spillFit for the periods before
and after the reforms, 1979-1985 and 1986-1996, respectively. In these analyses, I group
firms based on their patent portfolio size into three categories: firms with fewer than 5
patents (small firms), firms with 6 to 58 patents (medium firms), and firms with more than
58 patents (large firms). The effect of the pro-patent shifts on Fit in Chapter 2 are roughly
the same as Figures 1.5 to 1.7 in Chapter 1. Figures 2.4 to 2.6 investigate the effect of
the pro-patent shifts on spillFit for each group. In all of these figures, the kernel densities
experience a shift to the right following the pro-patent policy changes, which imply higher
spillFit after the establishment of the CAFC.
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Figure 2.3: Kernel Density of spillFit for Small Firms.
Figure 2.4: Kernel Density of spillFit for Medium Firms.
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Figure 2.5: Kernel Density of spillFit for Large Firms.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Estimates of the Market Value, Patenting, and R&D Equa-
tions
Table 2.2 contains estimates of patent thickets on market value (direct impact) based on
equation (2.7). Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.18 Both the estimated coef-
ficients on a firm’s own patent thicket (logFit−1) and others’ patent thickets (logspillFit−1)
indicate that patent thickets have a negative direct impact on market value. For example,
in Column 3, which contains estimates with firm fixed effects, the coefficient of logFit−1
implies that market value declines by 0.22% as fragmentation increases by 10%. However,
I lay limited emphasis on this result because the coefficient estimate is not statistically
18Clustering at the industry level (based on four-digit SIC codes) generates similar results to clustering
at the firm-level.
65
significant. The coefficient of logspillFit−1 shows that if fragmentation in the technology
market increases by 10% for other firms, the given firm experiences lower market value by
0.69%. This finding is statistically significant at a 1% level of significance. The estimated
negative impacts og patent thickets are robust to the use of industry fixed effects in column
4.19 The results in Table 2.2 support the hypothesis that patent thickets lower a firm’s
market value directly.20
Table 2.3 reports estimates of the effect of patent thickets on R&D expenditures, em-
ploying equation (2.8). The results in Column 1 show that the major determinant of R&D
expenditures of a given firm is its past R&D expenditures. While the coefficients on the
patent thicket variables, logFit−1 and logspillFit−1, are both positive, they are not statis-
tically significant, and even their magnitude is very small. The estimated coefficient of
logFit−1 in column 3 implies that a 10% increase in firms’ own patent thicket lowers R&D
expenditure by only 0.23%, and the coefficient estimate on the variable logspillFit−1 in
the same column suggests that a 10% increase in others’ patent thickets increases R&D
expenditures of a firm by only 0.08%. Hence, the proliferation of patents seems not to have
generated the “tragedy of anti-commons” in the manufacturing sector.
Table 2.4 reports estimates of patent thicket impacts on patenting activity, using equa-
tion (2.9). The results in columns 3 and 4 indicate that patent thickets have a positive and
19The estimation is based on equation (2.7), but instead of controlling for firm fixed effects, I control for
industry fixed effects, which are based on four-digit SIC codes. The industry fixed effects are for controlling
the possibility of dense patent thickets, which may be more likely in some industries than others.
20Since columns 3 and 4 allow for interactions among firms, there are controls for R&D spillover
(logspillR&Dit−1) and market structure (logHHIit−1) in these columns. In both columns, the vari-
able logspillR&Dit−1 has a statistically insignificant impact on market value, but with different signs and
sizes. The market structure has a positive and statistically significant impact on market value in column
3. The finding on the market structure variable corresponds to the notion that in highly concentrated
markets, firms have higher market power that leads to larger future expected earnings for those firms and
consequently, higher market value. This result is interesting as, to the best of my knowledge, there are few
studies that focus on the impact of market structure on the market value of firms, and they do not find a
statistically significant impact (Lindenberg and Ross, 1981 and Hirschey, 1985).
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statistically significant effect on patenting. The reported standard errors in Table 2.4 are
robust standard errors. The reason for using these standard errors is the over-dispersion
problem in the sample that leads to inefficiency in estimates.21 The estimated coefficient
on the variable logpre-sample patentsi, which is used to control for firm unobserved het-
erogeneity, is positive and statistically significant in columns 1 to 3. This result confirms
the need to control heterogeneity across firms with respect to their patenting behavior.22
21For a detailed explanation of the over-dispersion problem, refer to section 2.2.2
22For a detailed explanation of the reason behind using the variable pre-sample patentsi to control for
firm unobserved heterogenities, refer to section 2.2.2
28The signs ***, **, and * mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The numbers in the
parentheses are the cluster-robust standard error (clustered at the firm-level).
29The signs ***, **, and * mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The numbers in the
parentheses are the cluster-robust standard error at the firm-level).
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Table 2.2: Patent Thicket and Market Value
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
logqit
28






logSaleit−1 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
logSaleit−2 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.012**





)it−1 0.151*** 0.152*** 0.159*** 0.314***




2 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.132***




3 0.003 0.003 0.002** 0.006**




4 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001*** -0.003***




5 -0.001* -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log( PATstock
R&Dstock
)it−1 0.054** 0.055** 0.053*** 0.044***




2 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006




3 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
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Table 2.2 Continued





4 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000




5 0.010 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.055) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log(CITEstock
PATstock
)it−1 0.068 0.055 0.051 0.233*




2 -0.092 -0.081 -0.077 -0.358*




3 0.040 0.035 0.035 0.172*




4 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.035*




5 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.003*
(0.015) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
D(logFit = 0) -0.006 -0.007 -0.003
(0.012) (0.011) (0.018)
D(R&Dit = 0) -0.094** -0.094*** -0.100*** -0.081***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.023) (0.024)
D(Patentit = 0) 0.016 0.019 0.017 0.029
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.018)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No
Industry Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 11773 11773 11773 11773
R2 0.1364 0.1366 0.1397 0.2785
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Table 2.3: Patent Thicket and R&D
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
logR&Dit
29 Panel GMM
logFit−1 0.024 0.023 0.015 -0.012
(0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019)
logspillFit−1 0.008 0.012 0.020
(0.017) (0.010) (0.017)
logspillR&Dit−1 -0.004 0.010 0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
logR&Dit−1 0.726*** 0.727*** 0.726*** 0.944*** 0.329***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.007) (0.127)
logSaleit−1 0.187*** 0.186*** 0.187*** 0.181*** 0.078
(0.030) (0.037) (0.037) (0.023) (0.049)
logSaleit−2 -0.038 -0.037 -0.038 -0.144*** 0.103***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.021) (0.029)
logHHIit−1 -0.024 0.002 -0.023
(0.016) (0.015) (0.020)
D(logFit = 0) 0.029** 0.029** 0.024* 0.021
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
Firm Yes Yes Yes No No
Fixed Effects
Industry No No No Yes No
Fixed Effects
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
Observations 7340 7340 7340 7340 5496
R2 0.7294 0.7298 0.7299 0.9933
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2.4.2 Calculated Direct, Indirect, and Total Impacts
Table 2.5 displays the calculated direct and indirect impacts obtained using equations
(2.13), (2.14) and (2.15). I calculate these effects using both the estimates with firm
fixed effects (column 3 of Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4) and the estimates with industry fixed
effects (column 4 of Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4). Standard errors of direct, indirect, and total
impacts are estimated with non-parametric bootstrapping (the numbers in parentheses).
As a robustness check, I also report the standard errors based on wild bootstrapping (the
numbers in brackets).23
In models with firm fixed effects, the direct impact is negative, and indirect impacts
through R&D and patenting are positive. The direct impact shows that a 10% increase
in patent thickets is associated with a 0.9% decrease in firms’ market value. The in-
direct impact of patent thickets on market value through R&D is very small and sta-
tistically insignificant. However, the indirect impact of patent thickets on market value
through patenting is positive and statistically significant. As is expected, the beneficial
indirect impact of patent thickets on the market value through an increase in patenting
only partially offsets the negative direct impact of patent thickets. The total impact of
patent thickets on market value is negative and statistically significant. The estimates
imply that a 10% increase in the fragmentation of patent ownership decreases the market
value of firms by 0.81%. The models with industry fixed effects result in similar findings.
27The signs ***, **, and * mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The numbers in
parenthesis are standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity. Numbers in the brackets are
marginal effects.
23The number of replications in both of non-parametric bootstrapping and wild bootstrapping is 1000.
For a detailed explanation of non-parametric and wild bootstrapping procedures, refer to Cameron et al.
(2007).
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Table 2.4: Patent Thicket and Patent Propensity
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable: Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Patentit
27 Mean-scaling Mean-scaling Mean-scaling No Mean-scaling








logR&Dstockit−1 0.585*** 0.552*** 0.534*** 0.709***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020)
[1.822] [0.913] [0.896] [0.967]
logSaleit−1 -0.079*** -0.080*** -0.090*** -0.044***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
logSaleit−2 -0.023** -0.024** -0.015 -0.015**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007)
logHHIit−1 0.143*** -0.188**
(0.023) (0.068)
logpre-sample 0.441*** 0.361*** 0.340***
patentsi (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
D(logFit = 0) -2.317*** -2.300*** -2.363***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
D(R&Dit = 0) 0.175* 0.270** 0.282*** 0.583***
(0.091) (0.100) (0.096) (0.113)
Industry No No No Yes
Fixed Effects
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
Observations 11760 11760 11760 11760
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Table 2.5: Direct and Indirect Impacts of Fit and spillFit
Specification29 Direct Impact Indirect Impact Total Impact
INDIRECT INDIRECT
(R&D) (PATENTING)
Firm FE -0.091 +0.002 +0.008 -0.081
(0.030) (0.005) (0.003) (0.032)
[0.031] [0.007] [0.001] [0.030]
Industry FE -0.065 +0.004 +0.018 -0.043
(0.045) (0.007) (0.006) (0.047)
[0.044] [0.018] [0.002] [0.044]
2.5 Conclusion
The economic costs of patent thickets have been at the centre of ongoing debates on
reforming the US patent system. Economic analyses of patent thickets have provided
differing views on patent thickets’ effects. In this chapter, I estimate the direct and indirect
costs of patent thickets. The direct impact is the effect that patent thickets have on
firms’ market value, while I hold R&D and patenting activities of firms constant. The
indirect impact is the effect that patent thickets potentially have on market value through
29Direct impact is calculated based on equation (2.13). Indirect impact via R&D is calculated based
on equation (2.14). The indirect impact via patents is based on equation (2.15). The numbers in the
parentheses are the non-parametric bootstrapped standard errors. The numbers in the brackets are the
wild bootstrapped standard errors. In the models with industry fixed effects, the maximum likelihood
Poisson estimator of the patent equation encountered non-convergence 16 times out of 1000 bootstrapped
observations, when I measured standard errors. Models with firm FE are based on Column 3 of Tables
2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. Models with industry FE are based on Column 4 of Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4.
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patent thicket induced changes in R&D and through a patent thicket prompted increase
in defensive patenting. In the empirical models, I also incorporate the influence that other
firms’ patent thickets have on market value of a given firm. The analysis is conducted
using panel data on 1,272 publicly traded US manufacturing firms from 1979 to 1996.
The results show that patent thickets lower the market value of firms. The total impact
on market value is smaller in magnitude than the direct impact because firms avoid some
of the potential costs of patent thickets through defensive patenting. Hence, exclusively
focusing on patent thickets’ direct impact on market value overstates patent thickets’ neg-
ative impact on firms’ market value. Moreover, I find that thickets have no statistically
significant impact on firms’ R&D expenditures.
The merit of my analysis for intellectual property policy is that it quantifies the costs
of patent thickets. As the US considers potential patent reforms, the benefit of lowering
costs of patent thickets through, for example, lowering fragmentation in patent ownership
by increasing the requirements for obtaining patents must be weighed against the negative
effects that making patenting harder might have on the incentives to innovate.
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Chapter 3
Missing Observations on a Variable:
A Comparison of the Listwise
Deletion and Indicator Approaches
3.1 Introduction
Censored regressors and explanatory variables with missing observations are quite common
in applied research. Applied studies usually employ the listwise deletion method (LW),
which is also called complete case analysis, or the indicator method (DI) in models with
such regressors.1 The LW method deletes observations with missing values on one or more
of the regressors. The DI approach adds an indicator variable for missing observations of
a regressor and replaces all missing observations of the regressor with a constant.
1Little (1992) and Little and Rubin (2002) offer a summary of the methods used for solving the problem
of missing data in the literature.
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Only few studies have analyzed the performance of the DI and LW methods in models
with censored regressors or regressors with missing observations. In economics literature,
Rigobon and Stoker (2007) employ a model of censoring to a single value in the case of
censored regressors, and find unbiased estimates for the LW method and biased estimates
for the DI method.2 In statistics literature, Jones (1996) assumes missing completely at
random (MCAR) and finds that unlike the LW method, the DI method generates biased
estimates unless the regressors are uncorrelated.3 Jones (1996) further observes that if the
missing data mechanism is dependent on all explanatory variables, the estimates obtained
using the DI method are biased, while the LW estimates are unbiased.
Nevertheless, as has been observed by Jones (1996), the DI method is widely used
in empirical research in fields such as epidemiology, sample survey research, behavioral
science, and business and economics. Some of the examples in the economics literature
that employ the DI method are Hall and Ziedonis (2001), Ziedonis (2004), Bloom et al.
(2005), and Noel and Schankerman (2006).
One potential justification for the abundant use of the DI method in empirical research
might be the dependence of the mechanisms on whether observations on a regressor are
missing on unobserved error terms, and on the value of the regressor. When missing
observations on a regressor are dependent on unobserved error terms and the value of the
2Rigobon and Stoker (2007) assume exogenous censoring for censored regressors. To analyze the perfor-
mance of the DI and LW methods, Rigobon and Stoker (2007) employ a top-coding censoring mechanism
to generate censored data. In this mechanism, the observations of a regressor Xi, which are larger than a
single fixed value, for example ξ, are missing. Rigobon and Stoker also analyze the properties of the DI
and LW methods using a bottom-coding censoring and determine that the observations on the regressor
Xi are missing if Xi < ξ.
3Rubin (1976) categorizes the random missingness to missing completely at random (MCAR), and
missing at random (MAR). MCAR means the probability of being missing for the kth observation, xik,
of an explanatory variable Xi neither depends on its own value nor on the value of other fully observed
variables in the data set. If the probability of xik being missing does not depend on its realized value, but
depends on the values of other fully observed variables in the data set, the type of missingness is MAR.
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regressor, using the LW method could lead to selection bias and inconsistent estimates. Due
to the dependence of the missingness mechanism on the error term and on the regressor, the
complete sample – which is employed in the LW method – becomes a non-representative
sample of the population.
In contrast, the DI method uses all the available information, including the missing
observations on regressors (Cohen and Cohen, 1975 and Chow, 1979), and may avoid the
bias. Even if the missing observations are MCAR and the LW estimates are consistent,
the deletion of missing observations, when the LW method is used, implies an inherent loss
of information.
In this chapter, I examine whether cases can be found in which the estimates obtained
using the DI method are less biased than estimates obtained using the LW method. In my
analysis, whether an observation on a variable is missing depends both on the value of the
error term and on the value of the regressor. To my knowledge, the performance of the DI
and LW methods, in this case of missingness, has not been previously examined. Using
Monte Carlo simulations, this chapter seeks to fill this gap in the literature.4
The findings of Chapter 3 reveal conditions under which the biases of the estimates
in the LW method are bigger than the biases in the DI method, when the probability of
whether an observation on an explanatory variable is missing depends on the value of the
4Imputation methods are sometimes used for solving the problem of missing observations of explanatory
variables. These methods predict the missing observations of each variable from the observed values of
that variable. According to Little and Rubin (2002), the cost of imputation methods comes from their
requirement for making (possibly wrong) assumptions on the procedure which should be used for filling the
missing observations. This approach has approximation errors, which should be taken into account in the
inferences (Cameron and Trivedi, 2006, p. 923). Such errors make statistical inferences more complicated.
Maximum Likelihood approach is another suggested method to correct for missing observations in the
literature. The limitation of this method is related to its requirement for making an assumption on the
joint distribution of all variables with missing observations. Usually the multivariate normal distribution
is assumed, but this assumption might not be realistic (Allison, 2001). Moreover, ML generates different
results every time it is used. This happens since a random variation is deliberately added to the process.
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unobserved error term and on the (possibly unobserved) value of the regressor itself. The
results imply that recommendations in the existing literature to use the LW method are
not supported when missingness is dependent on unobserved error terms and the value of a
regressor. Therefore, the selection of a proper method and interpretation of the estimates
under each method requires greater care than is implied by the existing literature.
3.2 The Model
To analyze the biases in the DI and LW methods, I assume that the true model is of the
form
Yi = β0 + β1Xi + β2Zi + Ui, (3.1)
where the variables Zi and Ui are uniformly distributed on the interval [-0.5, 0.5] and [-1,
1], respectively. The variables Yi and Zi are always fully observed. The only variable with
missing observations is Xi. For each observation on Xi, one of two mechanisms is used
to set whether the observation on Xi is missing. I assume that with probability α, the
variable Xi has missing observations if Xi > Ui, and with probability (1− α), the variable
Xi has missing observations if XiUi < 0. With this missing data mechanism, both the
unobserved error term Ui and the value of Xi influence whether an observation on Xi is
missing. Following Jones (1996), I set β0 = 1, β1 = 2, and β2 = 1.
As has been observed by Jones (1996), the correlation of regressors is an important
determinant of whether the DI estimators of the parameters β1 and β2 are biased. There-
fore, to generate a correlation between regressors, I assume that the relation between the
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variable Xi and the variable Zi is given by
Xi = γ(δZi +Wi), (3.2)
where Wi is uniformly distributed on the interval [-0.5, 0.5], and γ and δ are parameters.
Employing these assumptions in Monte Carlo simulations, I examine the conditions
that lead to a smaller bias in the DI estimates than the LW estimates, when missingness
depends on unobserved error term Ui and on the variable Xi.
5
3.3 Properties of the DI and the LW Methods
This section employs the Monte Carlo simulations and examines the bias in the DI and
LW estimates, when the missing data mechanism is dependent on unobserved error term
Ui and on the variable Xi.
The true model employed in the simulations for the DI and the LW methods is equation
(3.1), and the relationship between Xi and Zi is defined as equation (3.2). The DI method
includes a dummy variable, denoted by Di, in the estimating equation to control for missing
observations. The variable Di is equal to one for observations for which Xi is observed and
zero for observations for whichXi is missing. This method replaces the missing observations






1 X0i ×Di + βDI2 Zi + βDI3 (1−Di) + Ui, (3.3)
5The results of the Monte Carlo simulations are quantitatively similar if I change the distribution of
the variable Xi to standard normal distribution, or if I alter equation (3.2).
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where the missing observations of the variable X0i are replaced with 0. The variables Yi
and Zi have no missing values.





1 X̃i + β
LW
2 Z̃i + Ũi, (3.4)
where the variables Ỹi, X̃i, Z̃i, and Ũi are the variables Yi, Xi, Zi, and Ui, respectively, from
the complete sample (the sample without any missing observations). For each reported
parameter combination, I perform 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations with a sample size of
1,000. For each simulation, I calculate the estimates of the parameters β1 and β2, while I
use the estimating equations (3.3) and (3.4) for the DI and LW methods, respectively.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 display the average of the estimates of the coefficients β1 and β2 in
the LW and DI methods across the 10,000 simulated samples assuming γ = 0.5 and δ = 0.5.
These figures also report the averages of the 95% confidence intervals from simulations for
β1 and β2.
As is illustrated by Figures 3.1 and 3.2, there are cases in which the bias of the estimates
of the parameters β1 and β2, which are obtained using the DI method, are smaller than
the bias of the corresponding estimates, which are obtained using the LW method. For
example, when the parameter α is in the range 0.6 to 1, the bias in the DI method is
smaller than the bias in the LW method for both coefficients. The results of the Monte
Carlo simulations are almost quantitatively similar if the value of γ is decreased or if the
value of δ is either increased or decreased, while I hold the other parameter constant.
However, for very large values of γ, the smaller bias of the DI method in comparison to
the LW method disappears, as is illustrated in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, in which values of γ
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Figure 3.1: Average of β̂1 in the LW and DI Methods (γ = δ = 0.5).
Figure 3.2: Average of β̂2 in the LW and DI Methods (γ = δ = 0.5).
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Figure 3.3: Average of β̂1 in the LW and DI Methods (γ = 1.3, δ = 0.5).
and δ are 1.3 and 0.5, respectively. With this value of γ, the DI method generates much
larger bias than the LW method on the coefficient of the variable Zi in Figure 3.4.
The observed smaller bias in the DI estimates of the parameters β1 and β2 in comparison
to the LW estimates of these parameters in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 indicates that the LW
method is not a better choice than the DI method. Sometimes, the DI method can indeed
alleviate the selection bias associated with missing observations as is often implicitly and
in some cases even explicitly implied in the applied economics literature. The next step is
gaining a better understanding of why these results are found based on different values of
γ and δ in terms of the variances and covariance of Xi and Zi.
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Figure 3.4: Average of β̂2 in the LW and DI Methods (γ = 1.3, δ = 0.5).
3.4 Conclusion
It is surprising that few studies in the literature have addressed the estimation problems
associated with censored regressors and explanatory variables with missing observations,
as such regressors are quite common in applied work. Studies usually recommend using the
listwise deletion approach (LW) over the dummy indicator approach (DI) for estimation.
Despite the findings of these studies, the DI method is widely used in empirical research
as is observed by Jones (1996). The abundant use of the DI method in practice implies
the likelihood of cases in which the bias of the DI method is smaller than that of the LW
method.
This study illustrates cases that lead to smaller bias in the estimates of the DI method
than the LW method, when the missingness on a regressor is correlated with unobserved
error terms and the values of the regressor. The examined cases of this research imply that
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the suggestion of the existing literature on selecting the LW method over the DI method
does not help with these specific types of missingness. Therefore, the selection of one
approach over the other one needs careful consideration.
In the end, the simulated samples in Monte Carlo simulations are samples of cross-
sectional data, and only one of the regressors has missing observations. Further research
is required to analyze the bias of the estimates of the DI and LW methods in the context






Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Correcting Truncation in Patent and Citation Counts
To correct for truncation in patent counts, I follow the approach of Hall et al. (2000), which defines weight





1996 ≤ t ≤ 1999,
where patentt is the number of patents granted at time t to all firms and weightk is built based on the
average of citations in each lag for the patents of firms.1 Hall et al. (2000) multiply patent counts in ending
years of the sample with the inverse of the weight factors (1/patent∗t ) and correct for the truncation. I only
correct patent counts for 1997 to 1999 because from 2000 to 2002 (end of my sample) the results are under
the “edge effect”(Hall et al., 2000). This means the 2002 data will not be usable and 2001 data will have
large variance. Figure A.1 displays a comparison of original and corrected patent counts for truncation.
To correct for truncations in citations, I employ the method of Hall et al. (2000). I calculate the
distribution of the fraction of citations received by each patent at a time between the grant year of the
citing patents and the grant year of the cited patent. Using this distribution, I predict the number of
citations received for each patent outside the range of the sample, maximum to 40 years after the grant
date of the patent. Figure A.2 displays a comparison of original and corrected citation counts. I use the
truncation corrected patent and citation counts in my analysis.
1Lags are defined as the difference between the ending years of the sample and year 1999. Therefore,
lags are 1999-1996=3, 1999-1997=2, 1999-1998=1, and 1999-1999=0.
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Figure A.1: Correction for Truncation in the Patent Counts.
Figure A.2: Correction for Truncation in the Citation Counts.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Derivation Steps of the Market Value Equation
Following the studies of Griliches (1981) and Hall et al. (2005), the general specification for market value
function is
logMarket V alueit = logSVit + σlog(TAit + γINAit). (B.1)
The variable logMarket V alueit is the log of the market value of firm i in year t. Following Hall et al.
(2005), the market value of a firm is calculated as the sum of the current market value of common and
preferred stocks, long-term debt adjusted for inflation, and short-term debts of the firm net of assets. In
the analysis of Hall et al. (2005), the variable logSVit includes time fixed effects (mt) and the error term
(εit). The term εit denotes the other factors that influence the market value of firm i in year t. I assume
that error terms εit are additive, independently and identically distributed across firms and over time,
and serially uncorrelated. The variables TAit and INAit are tangible and intangible assets, respectively.
Their measurement is discussed shortly. The coefficient γ is the shadow price of the intangible to tangible
asset ratio. Moving the variable TAit to the left-hand side in equation (B.1) allows left-hand side of this
equation to be written as log(Market V alueitTAit ) or Tobin’s q.







+mt + εMVit . (B.2)
Following Hall et al. (2005), the variable TAit is measured by the book value of firms based on their
balance sheet. The book value of a firm is calculated as the sum of net plant and equipment, inventories,
investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries, and intangibles and others. All of the components of TAit
are adjusted for inflation.2 INAit is measured based on the approach of Hall et al. (2005), who measure
the variable INAit with R&D intensity (R&Dstockit/TAit), patent intensity (PATstockit/R&Dstockit),
and citation yield per patent or citation intensity (CITEstockit/PATstockit). The variables R&Dstockit,
1The parameter σ is a scale factor in the value function. According to Hall et al. (2005), the assumption
of constant returns to scale with respect to assets usually holds in the cross-section. Thus, σ becomes one.
2Inflation adjustments are based on the CPI urban US index for 1992 (Source: http://www.bls.gov).
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PATstockit, and CITEstockit measure the stock of R&D, patents, and citations, respectively. These
variables are constructed based on a declining balance formula with the depreciation rate of 15%.3 Hall et
al. (2005) justify their method for measuring INAit of a firm by arguing that the firm’s R&D expenditures
show the intention of the firm to innovate. The R&D expenditures might become successful and result
in an innovation. Patents of the firm catalogue the success of the innovative activity, and the importance
of each patent is measured by the number of times it is cited in subsequent patents. Therefore, I employ
R&D intensity, patent intensity, and citation intensity to measure INAit, following Hall et al. (2005),






















+mt + εMVit . (B.3)
There is usually a difference between the application and grant date of patents. Out of the patents
applied close to the end date of the sample, only a small fraction is granted, and the rest are granted
outside the reach of the sample. This issue indicates truncation in patent counts. Citation counts are
also truncated. Truncation in citation counts happen since only citations that occur within the sample
are observable. I correct for these truncations. As a result, the PATstockit and CITEstockit variables
are corrected for truncations in patent and citation counts. See Appendix B.4 for detailed correction
procedures.
To estimate the impact of patent thicket on the market value of firms, I augment equation (B.3) with
the variables logFit as a measure of the firm’s own patent thicket, and logspillFit as a measure of other
firms’ patent thickets (the construction of these variables is explained in section 2.2.4). To control for R&D
spillovers, I include logspillR&Dit in equation (B.3), and the construction of this variable is explained in
Appendix B.3. The distributed lag structure in the firm level sales (logsaleit and logsaleit−1) decrease the
potential for inconsistent estimates due to demand shocks. To control for the effect of market structure
on the market value of firms, I also add the log of a Herfindahl index for market structure (logHHIit).
Finally, some firms might have a permanently higher market value than others due to omitted firm specific
effects.4 To control for the firm unobserved heterogeneity, I include αMVi in equation (B.3). Adding the






















+δ1logFit + δ2logspillFit + δ3logspillR&Dit + δ4logsaleit + δ5logsaleit−1
+δ6logHHIit +mt + αMVi + ε
MV
it . (B.4)
3Following Hall et al. (2005), the employed declining balance formula is Kt = (1−δ)Kt−1 +flowt. The
variables Kt and flowt stand for knowledge stock and knowledge flow at time t, respectively. I define the
initial stock of knowledge variables as the initial sample values of the knowledge variables similar to Noel
and Schankerman (2006). I select the parameter δ or depreciation rate equal to 15%. Most researchers
settled with this deprecation rate (Hall et al., 2000, 2005, and 2007). Hall and Mairesse (1995) show
experiments with different deprecation rates, and they conclude that changing the rate from 15% does not
make a difference. As a result, I select δ = 15%, and this selection further assists in easy comparisons to
previous studies.
4For example, this could be the result of the stock of past innovations at the beginning of the sample,
or a better ability of absorbing external technologies for reasons that are not explained by independent
variables.
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Equation (B.4) could be estimated with a non-linear least squares estimator, but it is easier to substitute
the non-linear terms with series expansions and estimate the equation with a linear estimator, following
Bloom et al. (2005) and Noel and Schankerman (2006).5 This approach makes the incorporation of firm
fixed effects easier. Therefore, equation (B.4) becomes




























+ δ4logsaleit + δ5logsaleit−1




where the parameters Ψ, Ω, and Γ denote the polynomials of the measures of intangible assets. Equation
(B.5) is used to build equation (2.7).
B.2 Indirect Impacts through R&D and Patenting












































5I would not approximate log(1 + θ INAitTAit ) with θ(
INAit
TAit
) because such an approximation is right if the
ratio of intangible assets to tangible assets is small. However, this ratio is large for high technology firms
in the manufacturing sector.
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× (β2 + β3). (B.7)
One point to note is that the R&D variable is a stock variable in equations (2.10) and (2.12), and is a
flow variable in equation (2.11). Following Hall et al. (2005), I define the relation between the R&D stock
and flow as
R&Dstockit = (1− δ)R&Dstockit−1 +R&Dit. (B.8)
Using the steady state condition (R&Dstockit = R&Dstockit−1 = R&Dstocki), and taking the logarithm
of both sides, equation (B.8) becomes





I use equation (B.10) in equation (B.6). The same applies to the patent variable as this variable is a
stock variable in equation (2.10) and is a count variable in equation (2.12).
B.3 Measuring Technology Spillovers
Firms in different industries interact with each other. These interactions imply the possibility of R&D
spillovers among firms. In order to measure the R&D spillovers, I follow the R&D spillovers literature that





The parameter ρij measures the closeness between firm i and j, and the variable R&Dstockjt stands
for the R&D stock of firm j at time t. According to Jaffe (1986), firms mostly benefit from R&D of
the firms that are closer to them in their technological field. Jaffe names ρij the technological proximity
between firms i and j, and he explains that ρij is built based on the uncentered correlation coefficient
of the location vectors of firms i and j (Si and Sj).6 For example, the location vector of each firm i
6The proximity measure of Jaffe (1986) is not directly under the impact of the length of the location
vectors, which are dependent on the concentration of firms in research fields. Other forms of proximity
measures such as Euclidean distance are highly dependent on the length of the location vector. For
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(Si) based on the distribution of the share of the firm i’s patents across N different technology classes is
Si = {si1, si2, ..., siN}, where sik shows firm i’s share of patents in the technology class k.








The range of ρij is between 0 and 1. It is closer to 1 for the firms that are closer to each other in their
technological field, and it is zero if the location vectors of firms are orthogonal.7 Noel and Schankerman
(2006) suggest using the distribution of the citations in the patents of each firm across N different technology
classes for location vectors. This means sik is the share of all citations in the patents of firm i that belong
to a technology class k. These citations reflect the benefits that the firm enjoys from the research activity
of others in the same technology field, because they exactly show the previous patents that the firm is
using in its innovation. Therefore, I follow Noel and Schankerman (2006) and utilize the distribution of
citations across 426 different technology classes of the USPTO in the sample of my analysis to build the
location vectors. Then, I use the proximity measure in equation (B.12) to calculate the R&D spillovers
that firm i receives at time t from other firms based on equation (B.11).8
B.4 Correcting Truncation in Patent and Citation
To correct for truncation in patent counts, I follow the approach of Hall et al. (2000), which defines weight




1996 ≤ t ≤ 1999,
where patentt is the number of patents granted at time t to all firms and weightk is built based on the
average of citations in each lag for the patents of firms.9 Hall et al. (2000) multiply patent counts in ending
years of the sample with the inverse of the weight factors (1/patent∗t ) and correct for the truncation. I only
correct patent counts for 1997 to 1999 because from 2000 to 2002 (end of my sample) the results are under
the “edge effect”(Hall et al., 2000). This means the 2002 data will not be usable and 2001 data will have
large variance. Figure B.1 displays a comparison of original and corrected patent counts for truncation.
To correct for truncations in citations, I have employed the method of Hall et al. (2000). I calculate
the distribution of the fraction of citations received by each patent at a time between the grant year of
the citing patents and the grant year of the cited patent. Using this distribution, I predict the number of
citations received for each patent outside the range of the sample, maximum to 40 years after the grant
date of the patent. Figure B.2 displays a comparison of original and corrected citation counts. I use the
truncation corrected patent and citation counts in my analysis.
example, in a Euclidean distance measure, diversified firms with orthogonal location vectors are counted
as close, since they are close to the origin of the coordinate system (Jaffe, 1986).
7The proximity measure is symmetric to the ordering of firms (ρij = ρji).
8In the proximity measure based on citation distribution, I exclude the self-citations, because they do
not impose any of the potential costs of patent thickets.
9Lags are defined as the difference between the ending years of the sample and year 1999. Therefore,
lags are 1999-1996=3, 1999-1997=2, 1999-1998=1, and 1999-1999=0.
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Figure B.1: Patents per R&D with Corrected and Not Corrected Patent Counts.
Figure B.2: Citations per R&D with Corrected and Not Corrected Citation Counts.
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